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RETHINKING CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY IN 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Liran Haim* 
ABSTRACT 
Financial products for consumers usually are characterized by 
complexity and incomprehensibility. Consumers typically find themselves 
defeated when attempting to control their financial destiny by 
understanding these products. This Article explores the economic and 
social factors that lead to this reality, analyzes its highly negative private 
and social ramifications and proposes an appropriate policy response. I 
argue that the current market structure creates a reality in which financial 
institutions are motivated to produce complex financial products for 
consumers in order to maximize their profits. This market structure, 
combined with inadequate policy, induces inefficiency by allocating the 
comprehension costs of financial products to the consumer. 
My thesis is that a fundamental change in risk allocation policy will 
steer the market toward consumer comprehension of financial products 
and, therefore, will reduce private and social costs, increase consumer trust 
in financial institutions and promote social cohesion. I propose a new 
default liability rule under which financial institutions would be required to 
introduce internal procedures and mechanisms to ensure product 
comprehension among all of their consumers. To encourage maximum 
compliance with my proposal, I suggest implementing a reputation-based 
incentives method that would require every financial institution branch to 
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publicly post a service quality ranking assigned by the regulator. I also 
support a trust-oriented licensing policy that would encourage the inclusion 
of new trustworthy financial institutions in the market and offer the 
implementation of a new regime for supervising financial product contract 
terms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial products for consumers are too incomprehensible. What are 
the factors that create this reality? Should it bother also those who 
understand what an APR is, how best to repay their student loans, or 
whether it is worthwhile to take out a mortgage? What role do financial 
institutions play in this reality, and should they be obligated to do more? 
Although these questions served as the backdrop to several topics of 
research during my academic career, I finally became motivated to examine 
them as a wider phenomenon last January. I had been invited to a dinner 
with a colleague of mine who just recently moved to New York. He had 
spent the previous several days searching for the least expensive way to 
transfer funds from his home country to the United States and finally 
decided to do so by opening a local “free checking account” in a large 
federal bank. When he examined his balance sheet a few days after the fund 
transfer, he was surprised to discover a charge of $30 more than he had 
been informed of when opening the account. A short conversation with his 
new banker revealed that the extra $30 represented a “correspondent fee,” 
which is a payment for a mediating bank (the correspondent) involved in 
executing the money transfer. 
As no one had directed his attention to the existence of a 
correspondent bank and to the possibility of this extra charge in advance, 
my colleague complained that all those hours spent searching for the 
cheapest products had been for naught, and that if he had been able to 
understand that the fee would include an extra $30 he would have used a 
money order. He also expressed his general frustration with the industry, 
claiming that there is no reason to research the prices of basic financial 
services, since in the end they are completely incomprehensible; therefore, 
he claimed “it’s just a total waste of time.” 
Although I had encountered similar incidents in the past, and had even 
contemplated the idea that there was a larger problem behind them, this 
story crystalized the issue for me: here was a well-educated and informed 
consumer who had conducted a market survey for the most efficient 
product, and still he could not make the most profitable decision. 
Unfortunately, this is a recurring story. Among those affected are: 
homeowners who lost their homes since they could not understand the fee 
structures on their mortgages when they were issued; consumers who 
suffered great financial distress since they did not understand the concepts 
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of “double cycle billing” or “universal default” on their credit card plans; or 
still other consumers who simply had observed the distress of others, lost 
their trust in the mainstream financial system, and opted out from becoming 
its consumers before even trying. However, what caught my attention this 
time was the repeating universal pattern of “too complex” and “too 
incomprehensible,” along with the fact that these are not just products 
designed for well-advised corporate clients, but, rather, a daily problem 
experienced by nearly every consumer who uses financial products. All of 
the above led me to believe that these individuals’ stories point to a larger 
phenomenon—that something is fundamentally wrong with our financial 
market’s consumer protection policy. 
Therefore, in this Article I will address the issue of “too complex” and 
“too incomprehensible” financial products for consumers and their effect on 
the market. As the topic of financial products for consumers is as broad, 
varied and complex as the products themselves my discussion will focus on 
the more prominent market failures and policy decisions that influence the 
issue of consumer financial product incomprehensibility. 
The discussion will go as follows: In the first part, I will analyze 
several unique characteristics of the consumer financial products market 
and present empirical data with respect to its complexity. In the second part, 
I will focus on the main causes of financial product complexity, arguing 
that under the current market structure financial institutions are motivated 
to maximize their profits by offering products that are too complex for 
comprehension by consumers. The third part will analyze the major failures 
caused by product complexity in the market of financial products for 
consumers, emphasizing the high costs incurred by consumers and the 
decrease in social welfare. The fourth part will analyze the approach taken 
by policy makers in order to deal with the market failures that result from 
consumer financial product complexity. I will argue that since complex 
financial products are considered to be a market constraint, regulators 
mainly focus their efforts on dealing with their incomprehensibility on the 
demand side of the market. This policy, together with market conditions, 
allocates the comprehension costs of financial products toward consumers 
by default. Finally, in part five, I will propose a change in risk allocation 
rules that shifts the costs of complexity to financial institutions, making it 
mandatory for them to adopt internal procedures and mechanisms that—by 
default—will ensure the result of financial product comprehension by each 
of their consumers. I will also propose several supportive measures for 
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steering the market toward the direction of comprehensibility. These 
measures will include a reputation-based incentive system that will require 
every financial institution branch to publicly post its assigned service 
quality ranking. It will also include a new trust oriented licensing policy 
that supports the inclusion of new trustworthy financial institutions in the 
market, as well as a new regime for supervising financial contract terms. As 
I will describe, my proposals stand not only to increase market efficiency, 
but also to engender important social values. My suggestions will be 
followed in part six by practical recommendations for policy makers and 
courts. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET 
The issue of product complexity exists in many different fields of 
consumer contracts.1 Nevertheless, when discussing financial products for 
consumers several unique realms should be considered. 
First, financial services are an essential gateway for any consumer who 
wishes to take part in the social mainstream. Basic options, such as 
receiving a salary, renting a car, purchasing on the internet and remote 
payment of bills, are hardly available to consumers without access to 
deposit-based products, electronic means of payments and other 
mainstream financial products. Therefore, while complex hotel packages or 
unclear mobile-phone bills might exclude consumers from using a specific 
retail product, the exclusion from the financial mainstream has much 
broader implications on a consumer’s life and social standing. 
Second, using financial products without understanding them exposes 
consumers to far more severe consequences than other ill-advised uses of 
retail products—a result that can be devastating to a consumer’s entire life, 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 See, e.g., RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT 
CARD MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD 128–38 (2007) (analyzing complexity aspects of credit card 
contracts); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 66–68, 141–45, 208–11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (analyzing complexity aspects 
of credit card, mortgages, and cellular contracts); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, 
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 506–08 
(2006) (mentions a few complexity aspects in the printer market and in hotel chains). 
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and sometimes even to her family.2 For instance, a consumer can lose her 
house due to a misunderstanding of the terms of her mortgage. Establishing 
a pension or life insurance plan can influence the rest of a consumer’s life. 
A consumer may find that her checking account has been depleted after 
losing her debit card. Her life savings may be lost due to investments that 
she did not fully understand. Additionally, she can be thrown out of the 
financial mainstream due to a bad credit rating. 
Third, financial products use terminology that—whether we like it or 
not—creates cognitive barriers of comprehension among large segments of 
the consumer population.3 Terms such as compound interest, revolving 
credit, nominal APR, etc., have a built-in cognitive mechanism which 
makes them more difficult to be understood and explained than free calling 
time on a cell phone or the amount of rides on one’s MetroCard. 
Fourth, the cumulative risk that consumers may lose their trust in 
financial institutions due to their incomprehension products has broad 
social consequences that do not exist with respect to any other product. 
Simply put, when many consumers who have lost their faith in financial 
institutions decide to run and withdraw their funds from their banks, society 
pays the price of the collapse of our financial system.4 
Understanding the special characteristics of consumer financial 
products is the first step to understanding the products on the market and 
their social importance. However, the second, no less important realm is 
that the current mainstream financial products are too incomprehensible for 
consumers.5 It is enough to examine basic data to grasp the scale of the 
phenomenon. According to a recent Consumer Financial Literacy Survey, 
33% of consumers could not anticipate the fees they would be charged by 
their bank or credit union.6 A previous survey conducted in 2011 found that 
                                                                                                                           
 
2 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7, 16 (2008) 
(defines credit products as the most complex products in the marketplace). 
3 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 334–35 (1986). 
4 Luigi Guiso, A Trust Driven Financial Crisis. Implications for the Future of Financial Markets 
11 (European Univ. Inst. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 2009). 
5 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 5 (“. . . innovation in financial products has produced 
incomprehensible terms and sharp practices that hurt consumers and reduce social welfare”). 
6 HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC., THE 2013 CONSUMER FINANCIAL LITERACY SURVEY 20, https:// 
www.nfcc.org/ newsroom/FinancialLiteracy/index.cfm (last visited July 20, 2013) (stating that the 
surveyed consumers were surprised in the past by a bank or credit union, for example, with regard to 
unexpected charges, holds on their money, or overdraft fees). 
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29% of adult consumers experienced the same difficulty with mortgage 
payments.7 It also found that 28% of adult consumers did not order a copy 
of their credit reports since they did not believe it would be of any use.8 
This data regarding consumers’ incomprehension of their daily financial 
products is amplified by initial data from the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), which state that 65% of all complaints filed to 
the Bureau in 2012 were resolved after an explanation was provided by the 
financial institution to the consumer’s complaint.9 This data suggests that 
such an explanation was not available or clear to the consumers when they 
purchased the product. More broadly speaking the data also indicates a 
phenomenon that I will discuss further later on: consumers do not truly 
understand most of their financial products most of the time.10 
Incomprehensible financial products for consumers influence market 
behavior in a very specific manner. Among other market rules, financial 
efficiency depends on price-based competition. In order to accomplish 
price-based competition, consumers must first understand the product that 
they intend to purchase. They should then be able to search the market for 
less expensive alternatives, and finally be allowed to switch from a more 
expensive option to a cheaper one. As ensuring a functional market of 
financial products is crucial for modern society, it is to be expected to be 
one of society’s first priorities. Nevertheless, when consumers cannot 
understand basic attributes of their products due to their 
incomprehensibility, they cannot undertake any efficient searching or 
switching actions. Should they attempt to do so, many of them will find that 
the product price has increased tremendously due to transaction costs. In the 
context of this Article, the most important costs are information (and its 
comprehension), search and switching costs. As we will see, when these 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC., THE 2011 CONSUMER FINANCIAL LITERACY SURVEY 11, http:// 
www.nfcc.org/newsroom/FinancialLiteracy/files2011/NFCC_2011Financial%20LiteracySurvey_FINA
LREPORT_033011.pdf (last visited July 20, 2013) (stating that 29% of surveyed consumers suggested 
that the terms of their mortgages turned out to be different than what they had initially expected). 
8 Id. at 13–14 (stating that 65% of adult consumers have not ordered a copy of their credit report 
during the past 12 months, and that 43% out of them did not do so as they believed it will not be useful). 
9 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT 24–25 (2012) (As 
mentioned in the report, the program became fully operational only at the end of 2012.). 
10 Id. at 23–26; see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 27 (citing a survey by the Center of 
American Progress and the Center for Responsible Lending which found that 38% of consumers believe 
that most financial products are too complicated for them to understand). 
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costs become too high in comparison to the product price and predicted 
benefits, they have the potential to create a disincentive for consumers to 
choose their products on price-related bases. 
To the naked eye, all consumers enjoy the privileges of a competitive 
financial market. They can search for financial services on the web, and 
especially in the various financial institutions’ pages, and they can also 
choose their financial services providers freely. The large array of financial 
institutions in the country should also contribute to vigorous competition 
among those institutions. Nevertheless, despite this apparent reality, the 
overwhelming data suggest that around 22% of United States households 
have never changed their bank accounts and that switching banks based on 
price-related considerations has been done only by 15% of consumers.11 
Moreover, 28% of United States households do not use mainstream 
financial services, while one in every twelve households do not even have a 
bank account—those consumers evidently use more expensive and limited-
function financial services.12 
The aforementioned analysis and data create a paradox. On the one 
hand, financial products for consumers are the most basic and crucial of 
products, not only for consumers but for the entire society. On the other 
hand, however, at least some consumers seem to avoid making price-based 
decisions with regard to their products or simply leave the financial system, 
with all of the consequences that such a decision carries with it. As I will 
elaborate later, those failures are only the tip on the iceberg of product 
complexity. Many of them, as well as others, are caused by a combination 
of a market structure that encourages the design of complex financial 
products and policy decisions that are unable to resolve these complexity 
failures. All of those factors contribute to sky-high financial product 
transaction costs and damage important social values. 
In order to fully evaluate these phenomena, my argument will continue 
in three main directions: First, I will isolate the current market 
characteristics which result in financial product complexity. Second, I will 
discuss the high additional costs that derive from that complexity. Third, I 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 Elizabeth K. Kiser, Household Switching Behavior at Depository Institutions: Evidence from 
Survey Data 8 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 44, 2002). 
12 SUSAN BURHOUSE & YAZMIN OSAKI, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED POPULATION 3 (2012). 
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will introduce the inefficiencies of the current policy that is being designed 
to address those products’ incomprehensibility by consumers. 
II. THE REASONS FOR FINANCIAL PRODUCT COMPLEXITY 
As we can see, consumer financial products have the tendency to 
influence consumers’ lives and society at large in vast ways. Why is it, 
then, that such important products, in particular, are considered to be the 
most complex of them all? When considering the reasons for financial 
product complexity, five main explanations can be offered. 
First, financial institutions typically hide the “extra” costs of the 
product inside the contract, exposing only the initial costs and the product 
benefits to the consumer’s naked eye. In this way, the unsophisticated 
consumer will encounter substantial difficulty in discovering the product’s 
hidden attributes prior to being charged for them. While it might be 
expected that those kinds of mechanisms would not survive in a 
competitive market, the work of Gabaix and Laibson on the concept of 
“shrouding” products contributes greatly to refuting this belief. Based upon 
the previous work of DellaVigna, Malmendier and Ellison,13 the Gabaix 
and Laibson model emphasizes “shrouding” as a mechanism that firms use 
in order to increase their profits by influencing up-front consumer decisions 
to purchase products, while sheltering their “unappealing” attributes, such 
as surcharges, back-ended fees, penalties, accessories and options.14 For 
example, banks will introduce consumers to the benefit of a checking 
account, while “hiding” in their contract certain fees, such as debit fees, 
ATM charges, bounced check fees, and the like. Therefore, in a competitive 
market, financial institutions that use unshrouded products will not be 
motivated to educate (“debias”) consumers, since this will only lead those 
consumers to use the shrouded products more sophisticatedly (instead of 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and 
Evidence, 119 Q.J. ECON. 353 (2004); Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120(2) Q.J. ECON. 
585 (2004). 
14 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 1, at 511–12; K. Jeremy Ko & Jared Williams, The Effects of 
Regulating Penalty Fees for Consumer Financial Products 2–3 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Risk, 
Strategy & Fin. Innovation, Working Paper No. 3, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122793. 
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causing them to switch from the shrouded product to an unshrouded one).15 
Consequently, shrouded products are an almost inevitable outcome of free 
market forces. 
Second, as financial institutions do not create new tangible products, 
but rather base their business on managing the population’s money, they 
must resort to much more complex ways of maximizing the efficiency of 
their product design. One of those ways is to design products that will have 
lower and simpler costs for consumers at the beginning of the product’s life 
(referred to as teaser rates), while matching their revenues by requiring 
much higher and varied costs as consumers increase their use of the 
product. As studies show, many consumers will focus on the short-term 
costs of a product, while dismissing its long-term costs (especially when 
those costs are more difficult to understand).16 Moreover, as the switching 
rates in the market for consumer financial products are relatively low, most 
consumers are likely to encounter the complex, long-term costs of the 
product. In this reality, as time goes by, many consumers are likely to find 
themselves with products that have become much more complex to 
comprehend. For example, while some issuers in the credit card market 
have adopted for many years a pricing technique that is based on repayment 
of their interchange fees by their consumers, many other issuers have 
worked for a long time to adopt new pricing techniques that reduce the 
initial costs of issuing and using the card. As such, those issuers have been 
able to offer credit cards with low initial and permanent costs, while 
matching their expenses of producing the cards and paying interchange fees 
with their revenues from charging high interest rates.17 The result is that 
while many consumers purchased those cards in order to enjoy the low 
initial fees, they have ended up paying much more for their credit uses—an 
outcome that they usually did not understand when purchasing the card. 
The point emphasized by the above example is that this new pricing 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 1, at 507; Ko & Williams, supra note 14, at 11. 
16 MANN, supra note 1, at 137–39. Ted O’Donoghue & Mathew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 
AM. ECON. REV. 103, 103–04 (1999) (discussing the connection between consumer impatience, 
sophistication and time preferences); Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-Biased Preferences 
and Credit Card Borrowing, 2 AM. ECON. J. 193, 203–04 (2010) (concluding that present-biased 
consumers are more likely to use credit cards extensively). 
17 Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 375, 384–92 (2007). 
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technique was very complex for consumers to comprehend, and, therefore, 
it was the cause of great confusion for consumers at different stages of the 
product’s life.18 
Third, many mainstream consumer financial products use compulsory 
bundling as a pricing technique. This means that the products are designed 
in such a way that consumers are required to purchase a package of services 
that financial institutions can profit from as a whole.19 The most salient 
example is the checking account, in which the fee structure is usually in the 
form of a monthly charge which includes the use of several financial 
services. Those charges are oftentimes reduced or waived if a consumer is 
obligated to maintain a certain balance in the account. Bundling is a highly 
profitable mechanism for financial institutions: first, as consumers probably 
will not use all the different bundled services each month; second, since the 
bundled product assists in “locking in” the consumers it places financial 
institutions in a better position to supply other financial services to them; 
and third, as financial institutions profit from the balance that consumers 
maintain in the account. Nevertheless, for consumers, the bundling of 
several services together makes it difficult to appreciate those services’ 
financial worth, as it inhibits their ability to evaluate or purchase each 
product on its own. Moreover, the more financial products are bundled 
together, many consumers will end up paying for services that they do not 
in fact need, but which are included in their “package.” This is another 
element that renders financial products (or the packages of products) more 
complex and incomprehensible for consumers.20 
Fourth, one of the main ways for financial institutions to compete with 
one another is segmentation—namely, designing products that will best 
serve the needs of specific segments of consumers. In this way, costs and 
revenues can be planned better by implementing more accurate predictions 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 MICHAEL S. BARR, NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 89–90 
(2012). 
19 BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 19–20; Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumers Misperception, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV 33, 38–46, 48–51 (2006). Barry Nalebuff, The Strategy of Bundling, in THE MANY 
FACETS OF LEADERSHIP 293, 295–301 (Marshall Goldsmith, Vijay Govindarajan, Beverly Kaye, Albert 
A. Vicere eds., 2002). 
20 BARRY NALEBUFF, BUNDLING, TYING, AND PORTFOLIO EFFECTS—CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 61–62 
(2003), available at http:// www.dti.gov.uk/CCP/topics2/pdf2/bundle1.pdf (describing the influence of 
bundling in obscuring true product prices). 
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of a specific segment’s needs and typical uses of a product. The result of 
segmentation on the one hand is much more efficient and profitable 
financial products; but on the other hand, it creates an increase in the 
amount of similar financial products with different fee structures.21 
Therefore, segmentation has the potential to cause consumer confusion over 
seemingly similar products (for instance several similar mortgage deals or a 
variety of checking account plans), despite the fact that one provides 
superior benefits over the other. Furthermore, as each financial product is 
characterized by a multiplicity of attributes, the segmentation process 
creates dozens and maybe hundreds of attributes worth consideration by 
consumers. As studies show, a consumer’s ability to understand those 
attributes declines rapidly as their number increases beyond three.22 
Therefore the segmentation process leads to products whose comprising 
attributes and different variations are too complex for the average consumer 
to comprehend. 
Fifth, since financial products involve financial and economic aspects, 
they are easier to define with complex financial wording, which is 
unintuitive to consumers. While the employees of financial institutions and 
their lawyers might understand this language and its terms, most consumers 
cannot make much sense out of it. For instance, a 2010 study indicates that 
consumers are unable to understand basic terms in their recently obtained 
mortgage agreements, such as “amount financed” (the loan amount minus 
finance charges), or “discount fee” (which is a fee they need to pay). Worse 
yet, some consumers misinterpret “amount financed” as the total amount of 
the loan, and “discount fee” as a discount, and therefore they end up taking 
out much more expensive loans than they had anticipated.23 Thus, we can 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 MANN, supra note 1, at 138. See also LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC 292–331 
(2003). 
22 Alan Schwartz, David M. Grether & Louis L. Wilde, Irrelevance of Information Overload: An 
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 296–97 (1986); MANN, supra note 1, at 134 
(reviewing the literature). 
23 James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer 
Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment with 
Mortgage Borrowers, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 516, 518–19 (2010); see also Jeffrey Davis, Protecting 
Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of 
Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 854–56 (1977) (finds that most consumers will face 
great difficulties understanding basic financial contracts such as credit card agreement). 
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see that a simple misunderstanding of financial wording can raise the level 
of complexity of financial products. 
This Article’s discussions thus far have led to the conclusion that 
under the current market structure financial institutions will produce 
complex and incomprehensible financial products in order to increase their 
profits. Not only do financial institutions lack incentive to change this 
reality, but it also appears that it is highly profitable arrangement for them. 
This situation begs the following question: is it so problematic that these 
products are complex? As I will elaborate, since product complexity leads 
to enormous private costs for consumers, reduces market competition, 
damages the social trust in the financial system and decreases social 
cohesion tremendously, it should be conceived as one of the more crucial 
problems of the market. 
III. THE COSTS OF COMPLEX FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
A. Transaction Costs for Consumers 
A consumer’s thorough assessment of all of the available information 
regarding a product is essential to making an informed decision in a 
competitive market. When the product is a $0.99 candy bar, an assessment 
of the information regarding the transaction is fairly simple. But, as a 
product becomes more and more complex, consumers might find that far 
more skills and resources are required in order to fully understand them, 
driving the additional costs of purchasing the product much higher. In a 
perfect market, those costs could cause inefficiency to the point at which 
consumers would consider giving up the use of the product. However, due 
to the nature of financial products, and especially their necessity in 
consumers’ day-to-day lives this option is inconceivable for many 
consumers, extremely expensive for others, and might even result in high 
cost for society. 
I will now proceed to examine the costs to consumers of understanding 
financial products, focusing on the market barriers that prevent them from 
comprehending those products while maintaining reasonable transaction 
costs. Since the costs of making sense out of financial products are 
extremely high, most consumers will not assume them and therefore will 
suffer the market inefficiency that comes with using incomprehensible 
products. 
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1. Information Costs 
As I mentioned, in light of the various product designs, techniques and 
market structures, financial products are very complex. One of the ways in 
which the market attempts to deal with this complexity is to provide 
consumers with large amounts of information, which is usually delivered to 
them by financial institutions—either as a result of practice or, as I will 
elaborate later, based on mandatory requirements of disclosure. The 
declared purpose of this information is to impart consumers with 
knowledge that will allow them to fully comprehend the different aspects of 
the products they are using. 
Under this premise, consumers who engage in the most basic 
transaction of opening a bank account will receive a 50-page booklet 
informing them of the different basic services and their fees; a consumer 
who issues a credit card will receive a lengthy credit card agreement 
detailing various interest rates, fees, legal provisions, etc.; and, most 
consumers of financial services will receive monthly statements and several 
other information packets on a regular basis. 
While some consumers might review this kind of information to some 
extent, many others will find it impossible to do so. As recent data shows, 
14.5% of adults in the United States lack basic literacy skills.24 This figure 
indicates that those consumers are simply unable to make sense of written 
information in English in any form. Moreover, many more consumers lack 
the basic numerical skills required to understand basic financial 
information. For example, only 18% of consumers surveyed could correctly 
calculate how much they would save on a $200 investment for two years at 
a 10% annual interest rate.25 In another group, 30% of participants 
responded incorrectly to all three basic questions involving simple 
probability, percentage and portion calculations, while only 16% responded 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT 
LITERACY (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_demographics.asp (stating that the interviewed 
adults demonstrated “below basic” English literacy skills, such as searching, comprehending, and using 
continuous texts, including editorials, news stories, brochures, and instructional materials). 
25 ANNAMARIA LUSARDI & OLIVIA S. MITCHELL, FINANCIAL LITERACY AND RETIREMENT 
PREPAREDNESS: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS 8–9 (2007), 
available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/25516/1/527633305.PDF. 
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correctly to all three questions.26 While illiterate consumers will have 
difficulty understanding many forms of products, innumerable consumers 
will find it especially difficult to understand financial products in particular, 
as numerical skills are essential to understanding basic financial concepts 
such as: compound interest, double cycle billing, APR, etc. Without 
understanding them, financial products will not make much sense. For those 
consumers the mere dissemination of such information by financial 
institutions reflects an unrealistic assumption—that they actually will be 
able to review the information without an immeasurable investment of 
resources. 
However, illiteracy and innumeracy are not the only reasons that 
prevent consumers from reviewing the handout information distributed by 
financial institutions. Current studies show that due to several cognitive 
barriers and biases, the more complex and less appealing the information is 
to the eye, the more consumers tends to ignore it, even if they are able 
technically to understand its wording to some extent.27 This tendency may 
even increase with regard to financial products, since those products 
involve in many cases greater risks for consumers.28 Moreover, in many 
cases consumers may not even appreciate that they are in need of the 
handout information or that this information will be relevant to their use of 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Lisa M. Schwartz, The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of Screening 
Mammography, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 966, 969 (1997) (the subjects were asked how many 
times a coin would come up heads in 1000 flips, to convert 1 out of 1000 to percentages, and to repeat 
this conversion backwards). 
27 Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too 
Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000) (concludes that overloading 
consumers with information can reduce their cognitive skills and their desire to choose); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1203 (2003) (“Because individuals’ selection of choice strategies can be viewed as balancing the desire 
to achieve accuracy with the desire to minimize effort, it follows logically that as decisions become 
more complex, decision-makers will tend to adopt simpler choice strategies to cope with that 
complexity.”). 
28 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, in BEHAVIORAL AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE: FIFTY YEARS OF DISCOVERY 153, 154–55 (Neil J. Smelser & Dean R. Gerstein eds., 
1986) (analyzing psychological biases in risky decisions); Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset 
Allocation and Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and Investor 
Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005) (reporting an experiment concerning with investment choices 
where more information and risk have caused the subjects to opt for the default option). 
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the product.29 Given this reality, the average consumer of a financial 
product who receives a 50-page booklet upon opening a bank account 
perceives it as such a distinct and stressful document that the only thing left 
to do, in most cases, is to put it in the drawer. 
However, assuming that all consumers will opt not to review financial 
product-related information is an oversimplified assumption. It is indeed 
probable that some consumers who possess enough education, time and 
resources will decide to review carefully at least some of the product 
information. Nevertheless, even for those consumers, the transaction costs 
necessary in order to understand the complex language of the variety of 
shrouded financial information regarding bundled products is extremely 
high. Therefore it is only reasonable that they will not assume them. 
The most difficult and time-consuming task involved in making sense 
out of the information is teasing out the relevant data, among the mixture of 
that which is supplied, and evaluating its impact on the specific consumer. 
Undertaking this task can prove to be extremely difficult even for highly 
educated and professional people, as the most relevant information (such as 
bounced check fees, overdraft rates, late fees, etc.) is shrouded inside a 
financial contract exposing only its immediate benefits to the naked eye.30 
Moreover, due to product bundling and segmentation it is quite likely that a 
consumer will be required to understand not only the sophisticated-
shrouded mechanism behind one product, but several products all bundled 
together into one shrouded contract.31 For most (if not all) consumers, 
undertaking this task will result in an exorbitant transaction costs. 
Perhaps one of the best ways to demonstrate the difficulty and 
complexity involved in understanding financial products to their full extent 
is to examine the resources needed for expert judges to understand these 
products. For instance, in the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Gerhardt 
v. Continental Insurance Co.,32 three judges expressed their frustration with 
the deliberated financial product, suggesting that its meaning was 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005). 
30 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 1, at 506–07; Ellison, supra note 13, at 619–20. 
31 See supra Part II (discussing the market effects of bundling and segmentation). 
32 Gerhardt v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 328 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966). 
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ambiguous, obscure and evidently incomprehensible to some of them.33 
United Kingdom judges reacted similarly in the J. Spurling (Ltd v. 
Bradshaw case, stating that banking contracts are obscure, and therefore, 
their contractual terms would have to be simplified before consumers could 
be held liable according to several of their clauses.34 In an Israeli case 
involving one of the largest Israeli banks (Leumi), three judges in the 
Standard Contracts Tribunal reviewed the bank’s current account contract. 
At their 194-page judgment which took seven years to be rendered, the 
judges indicated (apparently with some frustration) the high complexity of 
the contract, while eventually voiding 28 of its clauses.35 While those kinds 
of transaction costs can be absorbed by courts, they most certainly cannot 
be assumed by consumers. 
To conclude this point, it can be argued that despite all the 
aforementioned barriers, there may still be some highly educated and 
sophisticated consumers who can review the relevant financial information 
and even understand it with reasonable costs. If this is the case then those 
consumers can drive the market into efficient equilibrium by serving as 
proxies for ill-informed consumers.36 Although this reality can occur in 
some markets I believe that in the market of financial products for 
consumers, it is a highly improbable outcome mainly due to segmentation 
(aside from the low probability that any consumer will fully understand the 
financial products).37 As was previously described, financial institutions 
invest great efforts in creating products that will accommodate for different 
sectors’ needs. One effect of this practice is the segregation of the market to 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 309–10 (reporting that the judges inspected an insurance policy and 
stated as follows: “I don’t know what it means. I am stumped. They say one thing in big type and in 
small type they take it away.” “I can’t understand half of my insurance policies.” “I get the impression 
that insurance companies keep the language of their policies deliberately obscure.”) 
34 J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw, [1956] 1 WLR 461, 466 (Eng.). 
35 Plea 195/97 The Attorney Gen. v. Bank Leumi, PM 5736(1) 481 (2004) (Isr.). Also see, 
Ricardo Ben-Oliel, The Attorney General v. Bank Leumi—A Lengthy Appraisal by an Israeli Court of a 
Banking Account, 21 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 61 (2005). 
36 Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The 
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983) (concluding that in a market 
with homogenous consumers, the small and sophisticated part of consumers is enough to foster 
competition and bring the supplier to offer efficient product to the entire market); see also Clayton P. 
Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem , WIS. L. REV. 679, 691–92 (2004). 
37 MANN, supra note 1, at 139 (suggesting that in the credit card market the choice of the more 
sophisticated consumers will not drive the market toward efficiency). 
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different sectors by financial institutions and, subsequently, their ability to 
anticipate the specific products that will be used by those selected 
consumers who are actually able to comprehend them. Therefore, the more 
educated and sophisticated consumers will only drive a severely limited 
part of the market (that which uses products designed for the educated and 
sophisticated segment) toward efficiency, leaving the majority of 
consumers to deal with the high and inefficient costs of complexity.38 
2. Search Costs 
As it well known, a price-based substitution between products is 
essential for creating a competitive market. The main concept behind such 
substitution is that when consumers search and finds a financial institution 
that offers a similar yet cheaper product than the one they are currently 
using, rational consumers will switch to the cheaper product found. Price-
based competition also increases social welfare, as it brings upon 
competition between different financial institutions, which results in price 
reduction to the point of market equilibrium.39 However, given that in 
reality consumers do not maintain knowledge of all the various products, 
they will have to spend resources in order to search for it. Consumers will 
invest in this search for a cheaper product as long as the marginal search 
costs will exceed the profit they believe will be achieved from switching to 
the new product. Nevertheless, as was explained previously, most 
consumers inevitably will find it extremely difficult to comprehend their 
own financial products, let alone all of the others that they have found 
during their search.40 Therefore, product complexity will drive up the 
search costs for alternative financial products, thereby eliminating 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 Gillette, supra note 36, at 692–93 (suggesting that some sellers would be able to segregate 
buyers into classes and predict in advance which product will be used by each class. In this way seller 
will be able to continue and exploit unsophisticated buyers.). 
39 Paul Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. ECON. 
(1987); Steven A. Sharpe, The Effect of Consumer Switching Costs on Prices: A Theory and Its 
Application to the Bank Deposit Market, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 79 (1997); see also BAR-GILL, supra 
note 1, at 24–25. 
40 See supra Part II (explaining that as the number of product attributes exceed three, consumers 
will suffer a sharp decrease in their ability to comprehend those attributes). 
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consumers’ incentives to search among financial institutions even when 
they are not satisfied with their own. 
In order to better understand the high search costs of alternative 
financial products it is helpful to analyze the data from a survey conducted 
on Household Switching Behavior at Depository Institutions. According to 
the survey about 32% of United States households never have changed 
depository institutions.41 The main reason that brought 51% of consumers 
to change institutions was not price related, but rather due to some kind of 
relocation.42 In other words, most consumers have never changed banks or 
did so only when they had no choice. When asked why they had decided 
not to change banks, 34% of consumers who had stayed with their banks for 
more than one year stated that they did so “because it would be too much 
trouble” for them to close their account and open a new one elsewhere.43 
Given that under the current market structure search costs are extremely 
high due to incomprehensibility of alternative financial products, this 
“trouble” is completely understandable. Moreover, the data reveals that out 
of the 34% of consumers who stated that it would be “too much trouble” to 
switch banks, 63% demonstrated a moderate to high dissatisfaction with the 
financial services they were receiving in their current financial 
institutions.44 Thus, we can assume that in a perfect market, in which 
different alternatives were available to those consumers they would search 
for better financial products. However, as the complexity of products drive 
search costs to be extremely high, consumers are left with inefficient 
products. 
3. Switching Costs 
As product complexity leads to high information and search costs for 
consumers, relying on financial institutions’ customer service should 
become the efficient market solution for consumers to better understand 
complex products and switch to more profitable options. 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 ELIZABETH K. KISER, HOUSEHOLD SWITCHING BEHAVIOR AT DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA 5 (2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/ 
200244/200244pap.pdf (stating that the typical household tenure at a depository institution is 10 years). 
42 Id. at 6–7, 19. 
43 Id. at 10–11. 
44 Id. at 13, 25. 
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And indeed, as the data indicate, 75% of the entire households that 
stayed with their banks for more than one year did so due to customer 
service.45 Setting aside the fact that those numbers are considered extremely 
high, they also indicate that consumers do not utilize customer service in 
order to switch banks, but merely find it the best reason to stay with their 
own. From an economic perspective this means that consumers perceive the 
marginal cost of customer service to exceed the predicted benefits of 
switching. In other words, consumers have developed a strong reliance on 
financial institutions’ representatives to simplify their products for them, 
and they perceive this service to be even more important than financial 
product prices. Given that in the current market structure there is no duty to 
provide consumers the best available services, consumers have understood 
that finding the “right banker” can make the entire difference. 
The aforementioned conclusion is strengthened even further if we 
examine the loss of trust among consumers who found customer service to 
be inadequate or even abusive. As the data shows, some of those consumers 
simply left the mainstream financial system.46 As Caskey unequivocally 
explained, for those consumers it is worth paying more for their financial 
services—using pawnshops, money orders, non-bank cashing services—as 
long as they can understand the product and its fee structure by 
themselves.47 
The above analysis indicates that in the current structure of the 
financial products market, consumers design their choices while relying 
deeply on customer service, since they do not see a more effective and 
cheaper way to reduce the additional costs of understanding the nature of 
                                                                                                                           
 
45 KISER, supra note 41, at 10 (discussing how only 58% mentioned the price level as a factor); 
CLAIRE MATTHEWS, CHRIS MOORE & MALCOLM WRIGHT, WHY NOT SWITCH? SWITCHING COSTS AND 
SWITCHING LIKELIHOOD (2008), http://centre-bankingstudies.massey.ac.nz/fileadmin/research_outputs/ 
FinsiaPaper_Revised_Sept2008.pdf (last visited July 20, 2013) (indicating that around 50% of 
consumers in New Zealand conceives the difficulty of learning new bank products and the interruption 
in the routine services as an obstacle while considering whether to switch to another financial 
institution). 
46 BURHOUSE & OSAKI, supra note 12, at 26–28 (stating that 8.2% of previously banked 
households in the United States specifically mentioned that they do not keep a bank account since they 
distrust banks and their practices). 
47 JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS AND THE POOR 
68–83, 116–18 (1996). 
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the financial service. As such, consumers do not switch financial 
institutions on a price-related basis. 
That said, although the analysis so far explained how product 
complexity drives customer service to be a substantial factor for consumers 
of financial products, it still does not account fully for the negative 
influence of the situation on switching costs (other than considering 
customer service much more than prices). In fact due to the high price-tag 
that consumer of financial products place on customer service, it would be 
expected that they would actively initiate switching between financial 
institutions in accordance with their level of service. It would appear that 
the reason that this is not the reality is related to the difficulty in objectively 
evaluating customer service in advance in the financial product market. The 
immeasurable amount of factors to consider influences the way in which 
customer service is evaluated by consumers. Among those factors are the 
level of product understanding demonstrated by representatives, their 
training in effectively explaining it, the complexity of the products and their 
fee structures, and the nature of the consumer herself. Therefore, under 
current market structure, in order to evaluate the customer service of 
another financial institution one must first change providers.48 When faced 
with this choice it appears that at least some consumers opt to remain with 
their current institutions because they already possess the proper means to 
understand the main products and their fee structures.49 They prefer this 
option over taking the risks entailed in switching to a new institution where 
they cannot predict the outcomes in advance.50 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 Zsófia Tóth, Approaches to Consumer Trust in Banking Sector, with Special Regard to Young 
Customers, PROCEEDINGS OF FIKUSZ 205 (László Áron Kóczy ed., 2009) (stating that consumers trust 
in their current banks more than in other banks). 
49 To clarify, I am not suggesting that product complexity is the only cause of high switching 
costs at the market of financial products for consumers. Nevertheless, as I indicated, it is a substantial 
factor which drives switching costs to be extremely high. For discussion regarding other factors which 
influence switching costs, see James Surowiecki, Why Banks Stay Big, THE FINANCIAL PAGE, available 
at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial /2009/11/02/091102ta_talk_surowiecki?printable=true& 
currentPage=all (last visited July 20, 2013). 
50 KISER, supra note 41, at 15. 
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B. Transaction Costs for Financial Institutions 
When considering financial institutions’ transaction costs, the first 
question that must be asked is whether in practice such costs actually exist 
given the current market structure, or whether those costs justify a separate 
discussion. This question arises as in the current market structure any cost 
incurred by financial institutions will eventually be factored into the price 
of the product. Therefore, such a cost is no longer borne by the financial 
institution, rather by the consumer. Despite this confluence of costs, an 
independent discussion of each of them is warranted for two reasons. First, 
since those costs are incurred by financial institutions—at least in the first 
stages—it is important to introduce them as such in order to emphasis the 
institutions’ direct ability to reduce them. Second, the issue will be relevant 
to a later discussion in this Article in emphasizing the market dynamics in 
which financial institutions can produce complex products while making 
consumers bear the costs of complexity. 
So, what are the costs of financial institutions due to product 
complexity? They are mainly those costs incurred by employee training and 
information handling. As it turns out, consumers are not the only ones who 
find it difficult to understand the financial products being designed for 
them. In fact, those products are so complex that even some of the financial 
institutions’ employees have trouble understanding them. Those employees 
must be trained to understand the products. The data on this issue, naturally, 
is difficult to come by since financial institution employees will not admit 
that they could not fully comprehend the basic products that they sell to 
consumers. However, we can attempt to appreciate the scale of the 
phenomenon by examining related data. As indicated by the CFPB, 65% of 
all complaints filed in 2012 were resolved after further explanation was 
given by the financial institution.51 This data indicates that financial 
institutions incurred extra costs as a result of the additional explanations 
they were obliged to provide their consumers. Whereas at least a portion of 
those products and services are supplied directly by the financial 
institution’s employees (excluding automated products or services), it is 
only probable to assume that at least some of them did not possess a full 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 25. 
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understanding of the product when explaining it to their consumers (and 
thus further explanation was required in order to resolve the complaint). 
Furthermore, another 15% of complaints were reported resolved due to 
monetary relief.52 This means that the financial institution incurred the costs 
of handling those complaints and reimbursing consumers in light of 
misunderstandings involving their products. In order to fully evaluate the 
phenomenon, we should also keep in mind that the aforementioned figures 
are likely higher in reality, as the above do not include the costs of internal 
complaints and lawsuits submitted to the courts on which we have no 
accurate data. In attempting to reduce the costs of handling complaints, 
monetary relief, and legal proceedings, it is only logical that financial 
institutions will invest in training their employees to better understand their 
own complex products, at least to the point of limiting their exposure to a 
regulator’s scrutiny. 
Additionally, as was previously mentioned, financial institutions will 
incur the costs of handling the information related to their products. Those 
costs will include preparing, printing and distributing all of the products’ 
relevant information—whether this information is needed in practice or, as 
will be discussed later, mandated by the rules of disclosure.53 In addition to 
the fact that this information is difficult to construct, and in many cases will 
required the advice of economic, social and legal experts, it is also 
expensive to circulate—oftentimes on a monthly basis. 
As financial institutions will take those costs into account when 
designing their products, complexity will drive the costs of financial 
products even higher. 
C. Social Costs 
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that consumers pay 
high costs for financial product complexity. Nevertheless, the point I want 
to raise now is that this inefficiency cost is much higher than its absolute 
value, as it is not distributed equally among the various sectors of society. 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 Id. 
53 AS studies show, one of the main disadvantages of disclosure is its high societal costs. See, 
e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV 
647, 735–42 (2011); Ko & Williams, supra note 14, at 15–16, 22–25. 
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In fact, the cost of this inefficiency is borne mainly by low- and middle-
income (LMI) consumers, who essentially subsidize the use of complex 
products by other echelons of society. Thus, the additional social costs that 
we pay for product complexity—which I would claim are the highest of 
them all—are the decrease in social cohesion and equality among the 
population. Society also incurs high costs when large segments of the 
population use more expensive financial products designed by the fringe 
banking industry. 
As was elaborated above, consumers suffer from miscomprehension of 
their financial products and from a stagnant financial market—both are the 
result of the high transaction costs that derive from product complexity. As 
I also mentioned, comprehension of information is not defined in absolute 
terms; its definition is a matter of the relative level of understanding. This 
means that subject to incursion of transaction costs, some consumers will be 
able to understand financial products better than others. Following my 
previous analysis, factors such as education, time availability, and financial 
resources can help determine which level of comprehension each consumer 
may reach. As we know, these factors are highly correlated to one’s socio-
economic class.54 Therefore, the probability that high income consumers 
will find it easier to understand financial products than moderate and 
especially low income consumers is more than likely. Thus, as the “more 
informed” consumers will have better means of understanding financial 
products, LMI consumers will be left with the choice of using them without 
understanding them (at least to some extent) or finding alternatives to 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 See, e.g., Jean Kinsey & Ray McAlister, Consumer Knowledge of the Costs of Open-end 
Credit, 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 249, 260 (1981) (finds that low levels of income and education are 
correlated with less knowledge and understanding of the basic information related to credit cards); 
Angela C. Lyons, Mitchell Rachlis & Eric Scherpf, What’s in a Score? Differences in Consumers’ 
Credit Knowledge Using OLS and Quantile Regressions, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 223, 236–37 (2007) 
(finds that LMI, older and Hispanic consumers tend to be significantly less informed with regard to their 
credit reports than the rest of the population); Simon Firestone, Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, The 
Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages, 35 REAL ESTATE ECON., 479 (2007) (finds that 
low-income consumers are less likely to repay their mortgages at the optimal time); Nadia Massoud, 
Anthony Saunders & Barry Scholnick, Who Makes Credit Card Mistakes (2007), available at 
www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/events/2007/consumer-credit-and-payments/papers/ 
Scholnick_Who_Makes_Credit_Card_Mistakes.pdf (finds that poor people are more likely to pay fees 
by mistake). 
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mainstream financial products. As I will elaborate, both of those choices 
carry intolerable social costs. 
The LMI consumers who choose to use incomprehensible financial 
products will pay the market costs of price structuring, shrouded attributes, 
bundling and segmentation. When doing so, LMI consumers will subsidize 
the use of complex financial products by other consumers.55 Thus, an 
unimaginable reality is created in which consumers that have less subsidize 
the use of financial products for consumers who have more. On the other 
hand, LMI consumers who choose not to use financial institution products 
will find themselves outside the financial mainstream. In this case they will 
find it very difficult to function in modern society and probably will look 
for alternative financial services. As Caskey’s work indicates, those 
consumers will find their refuge in “fringe banking,” which includes 
pawnshops, check cashing outlets, money orders, etc. While those 
institutions are probably better at serving LMI consumers, they exclude 
their consumers from the financial mainstream and are very costly not only 
to LMI consumers, but to the entire society.56 Moreover, the overwhelming 
result of this reality is a deterioration of consumer trust in their financial 
institutions, which may incur, as I will explore later, an even more 
expensive social price.57 
As we examine the two options available for LMI consumers due to 
financial product complexity, we acknowledge the sad reality that even 
today—half a century after the publication of David Caplovitz’s important 
work—the poor still pay more, at least for their financial products.58 As a 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 KO & Williams, supra note 14, at 28 (stating that consumers who understand more aspects of 
shrouded products pay less than the ones that do not understand them). 
56 In a joint research which I am currently conducting with Ronald Mann, we analyze the social 
costs of fringe banking and compare them with the costs of electronic payments. We find that the costs 
of fringe banking are relatively much higher in comparison with electronic payments since fringe 
banking use mainly paper-based payment instruments which are much more expensive to society due to 
their high production costs, checkout time, handling costs and safety costs. Also, fringe banking does 
not enjoy the advantages of economies of scale, which prevents them from reducing those costs as the 
time passes. See Liran Haim & Ronald J. Mann, Putting Stored-Value Cards in Their Place 
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with the author). See also Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: 
Regulating Financial Services for Low- and Middle-Income Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
729, 738–46 (2012); CASKEY, supra note 47, at 68–84. 
57 See infra Part V.B. 
58 DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MOREௗ: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 
(2007). 
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modern society that aspires toward equality among its population, we 
cannot accept such a blow to social cohesion. Under these circumstances 
the cost of complex financial product design is simply not worth the social 
price. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING PROTECTIVE POLICY FOR CONSUMERS OF COMPLEX 
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that although the 
market forces drive financial institutions to issue complex products for 
consumers, the result is not beneficial to consumers and society. My 
analysis, so far, demonstrates that financial product complexity results in 
unreasonable transaction costs for consumers, such that they cannot 
appreciate the true nature, attributes and costs of their financial products. 
Those products also incur high social costs. Therefore, while complexity is 
the result of excessive financial product planning and market conditions, it 
creates a reality of unreasonable costs for consumers and a decrease in 
social welfare. In fact, the data indicates a failure that drives market forces 
toward complex financial products, while resulting in an unbeneficial 
outcome. 
In light of these conclusions, in the next stage of the discussion I will 
examine the ways in which policy has dealt with these failures so far. While 
various scholars have criticized several of the tools employed by policy 
makers, I will attempt to take a step back and explain the common ground 
behind the use of each of those tools in the policy context. As I will 
elaborate, it appears that this common ground focuses on the demand side 
of the market—in other word, the failures that occur when consumers try to 
understand financial products—rather than on regulating more intensively 
the supply side that apparently plays a role in driving the market to this 
inefficient place. 
A. Disclosure Rules 
The first and perhaps most salient policy tool that is used to impart 
consumers with information regarding their financial products is mandatory 
disclosure. Over recent years disclosure rules have become the panacea that 
policy makers employ in an attempt to cure the variety of consumer pain 
and suffering in the financial market. The main premise behind using 
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disclosure is that it provides consumers the information that they need to 
understand their financial products and make informed decisions. However, 
as I suggested before, mandatory disclosure has not solved the problems of 
transaction costs in the financial market—if anything it has exacerbated 
them. 
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and its subsequent amendments and 
regulations are perhaps the best example of the limited effect of disclosure. 
The TILA assumes that the extension of credit to consumers may be 
simplified by imposing various disclosure rules on financial institutions.59 
As a result of the TILA, many lenders in the financial market are required 
by law to reveal and even highlight (sometimes in special formats) credit 
information for their consumers.60 Despite this strong regulatory 
intervention, it appears that after almost 50 years of extensive and growing 
disclosure, there are still many consumers who do not understand the basic 
features of their loans61 or cannot appreciate the costs of credit.62 For this 
high amount of consumers, disclosure did not solve the fundamental 
problem of comprehension. 
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) was, and still is, 
premised on the same notion.63 It required mortgage lenders to supply 
mandatory disclosure regarding the nature and costs of the real estate 
settlement process. It even created the forms through which disclosure must 
be conducted. Again, the notion behind this regulation was that consumers 
are able to make a more conscious choice when applying for a mortgage if 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 The Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2013) (Section 1601 states: “It is 
the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be 
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card 
practices.”). 
60 The most salient term that must be disclosed is the Annual Percentage Rate (APR). Other terms 
include fees, grace period, finance calculation method, etc. 
61 Lauren E. Willis, Decision Making and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 789–98 (2006). 
62 Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Understanding of APRs 
and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 70 (1999); Nadia Massoud, Anthony 
Saunders & Barry Scholnick, Who Makes Credit Card Mistakes (Aug. 2007), www.philadelphiafed 
.org/research-and-data/events/2007/consumer-credit-and-payments/papers/Scholnick_Who_Makes_ 
Credit_Card_Mistakes.pdf (stating that consumers pay late fees and penalties while using their credit 
cards due to misunderstanding of the product). 
63 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2012). 
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they have all of the information at their disposal. Nevertheless, it seemed 
that these disclosure rules also failed to give consumers a better 
understanding of the cost of mortgages. In fact the best evidence of this 
failure is that recently the rules have been redesigned by the CFPB.64 
Why did disclosure fail? Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s study tries to 
answer this question by analyzing a verity of consumer products and 
empirical studies on mandatory disclosure relating to those products.65 In 
the context of the financial product market, the following are the four most 
compelling arguments as to the failure of disclosure. 
First, as consumers are only able to digest certain amounts of 
information, disclosure rules work best when they come in small doses—in 
other words, when there are only a few important details that consumers 
need to know about a product.66 However, disclosed information becomes 
very ineffective when a consumer who applies for a mortgage receives 
dozens of pages containing figures and miscellaneous information on a 
wide variety of topics that they are unlikely to be able to examine and 
decipher. 
Second, as innovation is considered to be the power behind financial 
products, it will be difficult for mandatory disclosure to keep up with it.67 
Even if disclosure will allow some consumers to understand financial 
products to some extent,68 the financial institutions’ reaction will be to 
restructure the product in a new and more complex way in order to protect 
their pricing techniques—making disclosure irrelevant, at least in part. The 
TILA’s disclosure rules, for example, became less effective when credit 
card issuers adopted the new over-limit fees back in the nineties, since 
those were not a part of the TILA’s original disclosure requirement.69 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 See infra Part IV.A. 
65 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 53, at 679–729. 
66 Id. at 705–09 (stating the large quantity of information that consumers are being required to 
deal with during one day at modern society). 
67 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 85 (stating that in the race between the regulator and 
financial institutions, regulation will most probably be left behind). 
68 Consumer understanding can also occur to some extent by financial institutions that will 
introduce new pricing techniques that will undercut current fee structure. 
69 Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 243 (2004) (ruling that over-limit fees 
are not part of finance charges as defined by TILA). From this reason I also have doubts regarding an 
argument raised by Bar-Gill, claiming that regulators can design more efficient disclosure rules by 
identifying the most important information for consumers and presenting it in the simplest way. See 
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Third, some consumers simply do not possess the basic skills or 
resources to understand the disclosed information. As Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider point out, consumers will find it extremely hard to locate the 
information, make sense of it, understand its relevance and true meaning, or 
even remember its content for further use.70 As was discussed above, those 
difficulties have become extremely high due to studies indicating consumer 
reluctance to utilize financial institutions.71 
Finally, as a recent study also shows, disclosure entails high private 
and social costs. Again, financial institutions bear the burden of preparing 
and disseminating the disclosed information. As the risk of negligent 
disclosure is extremely high, they are likely to seek legal assistance in order 
to do so. Consumers in turn dedicate many resources to understanding the 
disclosed information, often rendering their transaction costs sky high. 
Simultaneously, legislators constantly work to keep up with financial 
innovations of complex products, and thus great legislative resources are 
expended only to find that the financial institutions have already switched 
to different techniques that are not yet covered by current disclosure rules. 
And lastly, society pays the price of decreased competition and reduction in 
social cohesion, as the ill-informed consumers subsidize those who are able 
to make some sense out of the disclosed information.72 
The above picture regarding the failure of disclosure as a consumer 
protection measure is quite powerful. The inability to influence the 
consumer side of the market for financial products by providing more and 
more information is rather obvious. Nevertheless, disclosure continues to be 
one of the main instruments adopted by financial product consumer 
protection regulations. The Dodd-Frank Act adopted disclosure as one of its 
main tools to achieve a more effective consumer protection regime. It even 
introduced the concept of disclosure trials, which are intended to improve 
the ways in which disclosure imparts consumers with information.73 The 
                                                                                                                           
 
BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 37. As I mentioned, at least with regard to consumers financial products, a 
disclosure of this kind—even if effective—will just bring financial institutions to change their pricing 
method and reshrouded their product in a way that will eliminate the advantages of the new disclosure 
rules. 
70 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 53, at 710–23. 
71 See supra Part III.C. 
72 Ko & Williams, supra note 14, at 28. 
73 12 U.S.C. § 5532 (2012). 
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CFPB has stated that it will adopt electronic disclosure in order to ensure 
better consumer comprehension of financial products.74 The Bureau has 
also introduced us recently to the new and improved mortgage disclosure 
forms, which yet again entail immense amounts of information in small 
fonts, high density and complex wording.75 As the effectiveness of 
disclosure is highly dubious, the insistence on the part of policy makers to 
continue its extensive use is peculiar, particularly in the consumer financial 
product market.76 
B. Educating Consumers 
Another highly popular policy tool for imparting knowledge of 
financial products to consumers is offering educational programs for 
financial literacy, mainly in more “needed” areas.77 The basic concept 
behind those programs are that consumers are able to make far more 
conscious decisions when they are better informed about concepts such as 
money, compound interest, credit, bank accounts etc.78 Resources are 
therefore constantly invested by policy makers in various financial literacy 
educational programs. For quite some time these programs have been 
available for those who need them, such as high-school students, LMI 
consumers, the elderly, etc.79 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU STRATEGIC 
PLAN FY 2013—FY 2017 (Feb. 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/strategic-plan/ (stating the 
Bureau’s main goal as: “consumers can understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with 
consumer financial products and services initially and over the term of the product or service” and that 
one way to fulfill this goal is to “develop ways to provide financial product disclosure information to 
consumers electronically”). 
75 Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act (Regulation X), 12 C.F.R. § 1024 (2012); Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2012). 
76 To clarify, whereas my analysis addresses only financial products it most certainly does not my 
intention to totally dismiss disclosure as a consumer protection tool. As I mentioned, disclosure might 
be useful with small and concise doses of information. However, as I discuss one of the most complex 
products available for consumers which probably has the most influence on their lives, I believe that as a 
policy tool its faults exceeds its benefits. 
77 Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 202–04 (2009). 
See also supra note 25. 
78 Willis, supra note 77, at 202–04. 
79 See Financial Literacy and Education Commission, Promoting Financial Success in the United 
States: National Strategy for Financial Literacy (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 
financial-education/Documents/NationalStrategyBook_12310%20%282%29.pdf. 
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However, as studies show, like disclosure, the impact of financial 
literacy educational programs on consumer understanding of financial 
products is controversial.80 One study which examined the impact of 
personal financial management courses on high-school students found that 
the students who took the course were no more financially literate than 
those who did not.81 Another study indicates that short-term credit 
education does not assist LMI consumers in making more informed credit 
decisions.82 In light of those and other similar studies, some actually 
perceive financial literacy education to be part of the problem and not the 
solution.83 
When considering the reasons for the limited success of financial 
literacy education, not surprisingly, we encounter very similar obstacles to 
those which stand in the way of the success of mandatory disclosure policy. 
As it would appear, the skills needed to understand today’s complex 
financial products are varied, and there is only a limited amount of skills 
that seminars on credit rates or house mortgages can teach. Even if we 
assume that education can impart consumers with the knowledge that will 
allow them to understand each product’s attributes, there still will remain 
too many relevant attributes that due to cognitive barriers consumers will 
not be able to consider at the same time.84 Moreover, the constant 
innovation, pricing, bundling and reshrouding techniques in the financial 
product market render the knowledge acquired irrelevant after a short 
period of time.85 Finally, studies now show that the costs of financial 
literacy education programs are harmful to social welfare in light of their 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 Willis, supra note 77, at 202–04, 260–75. See also Mann, supra note 56, at 740. 
81 Lewis Mandell & Linda Schmid Klein, The Impact of Financial Literacy Education on 
Subsequent Financial Behavior, 20 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING 15 (2009). 
82 Jinhee Kim, E. Thomas Garman & Benoit Sorhaindo, Relationships Among Credit Counseling 
Clients’ Financial Well-being, Financial Behaviors, Financial Stressor Events, and Health, 14 J. FIN. 
COUNSELING & PLANNING 75, 77, 85 (2003) (“This study showed that there were no significant and 
direct effect of credit counseling on financial behavior, financial well-being or health.”). 
83 See, e.g., Willis, supra note 77, at 283–85; Mandell & Klein, supra note 81. Michael Kosfeld & 
Ulrich Schüwer, Add-on Pricing, Naive Consumers, and the Hidden Welfare Costs of Education (2011), 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/ dp6061.html (last visited July 20, 2013). 
84 See supra Part II, supra note 22. 
85 For the credit card consumers of the nineties, understanding the concept of over the limit fees 
was very helpful while in the new millennium this concept has been replaced by “double cycle billing.” 
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controversial benefits.86 It would seem that the results of those studies 
would only be amplified if we were to consider the additional transaction 
costs that consumers incur by participating in such programs. 
Despite this overwhelming data on the highly controversial 
effectiveness of consumer education, the Dodd-Frank Act designated 
financial literacy education as a means of addressing financial product 
complexity and supporting the inclusion of LMI consumers into the 
financial mainstream.87 Moreover the Act empowers the director of the 
CFPB to establish an office of financial education, which is to be charged 
with developing initiatives and strategies to educate and empower 
consumers to make better financial decisions.88 As was recently published 
by the CFPB this office, together with other five offices of the Bureau, will 
work under a national strategy to reach consumers in key moments of their 
financial lives, when they are assumed to be most receptive to receiving 
financial education.89 The Bureau will supply those consumers with 
relevant information, tools and support that will enhance their financial 
knowledge.90 Even if we ignore the aforementioned data and assume that 
the new national strategy will have some impact on consumers’ financial 
skills, it will still face what I consider to be the biggest flaw of financial 
literacy education—it cannot successfully reach all who need it. Given this 
reality, even if the new policy should have some success, it will still serve 
to increase the inequality in society, since the burden of subsidization will 
fall on much smaller groups that will not be able to achieve its benefits.91 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 Willis, supra note 77, at 260–75; Kosfeld & Schüwer, supra note 83 (stating that educating 
consumer in competitive markets may decrease social welfare if education is insufficient to alter the 
equilibrium information and pricing strategy of firms). 
87 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111 Pub. L. No. 203 
§ 1205(b)(2). 
88 Id. § 1013(d). 
89 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FINANCIAL LITERACY ANNUAL REPORT 14–26 (2013), http:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/financial-literacy-annual-report/. 
90 Id. 
91 See supra Part III.C. 
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C. Supporting Equal Financial Options 
While competition is considered the primary motivation for financial 
institutions to improve their products to suit consumer demands (including 
the demand for more comprehensible products), some discussion is required 
on the efforts of policy makers to increase competition in the financial 
product markets. As studies indicate that the distribution of bank branches 
is comparatively low in LMI communities, policy makers focus their efforts 
on increasing competition in those areas. 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is arguably the most salient 
tool that has been employed in an attempt to address this issue.92 Its original 
goal was to improve credit service in LMI areas by encouraging the 
opening of more bank branches and increased competition in the financial 
market for LMI consumers, but it soon began to consider the effectiveness 
of retail banking services in matching the communities’ demands.93 As LMI 
consumers also desire understanding their financial products,94 the 
consideration of such parameters in a bank’s CRA rating, presumably, 
should have led to the creation of more comprehensible financial products. 
While some scholars criticized the efficiency of this tool and others 
lauded its commendable goal,95 one thing is certain—the increase in 
competition did not cause consumers to receive products that they could 
understand better or desire more. 
As studies indicate quite strikingly, LMI consumers still do not 
understand many of the mainstream financial products. For instance, as was 
revealed in a recent survey by the Federal Reserve, 26% of unbanked 
consumers explained that they do not need a bank account but used much 
more expensive non-bank services. Another 7.1% stated that they do not 
trust bankers and their products.96 
There are several reasons, however, why even a strong competition-
encouraging force, such as the CRA, does not render the LMI consumer 
financial product market functional—and, in fact, much improvement 
                                                                                                                           
 
92 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2013). 
93 CASKEY, supra note 47, at 133–35; Barr, supra note 29, at 106–13. 
94 See e.g., Mann, supra note 56, at 741 (emphasizing the importance of financial product 
comprehension for LMI consumers). 
95 Barr, supra note 29, at 113–120. 
96 BURHOUSE & OSAKI, supra note 12, at 3. 
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remains necessary. First, despite the CRA, it seems that the mainstream 
financial options available to LMI consumers remain insufficient to achieve 
a competitive outcome.97 The economy of shrouded products provides a 
second explanation: competition does not actually motivate financial 
institutions to debias consumers, but rather to create more shrouded 
products. Therefore, competition will not resolve financial product 
complexity problems.98 A third explanation, offered by Mann, is that 
complex products are simply the only way that mainstream financial 
institutions know to make profit.99 Fourth, as was discussed above, there is 
a certain “chicken and egg” syndrome at play, in which consumers of 
complex financial products rely heavily on customer service and therefore 
never switch banks. As a result, those banks never feel competitive 
pressure.100 And finally, it is highly likely that the current market structure 
relies on a certain percentage of consumers not fully understanding 
financial products. After all when LMI consumers pays more in fringe 
banking for products which are cheaper in mainstream banking, policy 
needs to be changed. 
Acknowledging this problem, the Dodd-Frank Act initiated 
sponsorship programs to encourage financial institutions to create suitable 
accounts and payday loans for LMI consumers.101 The only problem with 
this idea is that it appeals mainly to the current types of mainstream 
financial institutions, and there is no reason to believe that they will change 
their primary methods of doing business. As was explained before, it seems 
that strong market forces will drive those institutions to continue to create 
complex products. Should this prove to be true, this policy will suffer from 
the main flaws of its predecessors. 
                                                                                                                           
 
97 Many consumers still find it easier and more available to use fringe banking institutions rather 
than mainstream financial institutions. In this context the number of 28% of underbanked households 
speaks for itself. For these statistics see id. at 5. 
98 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 1, at 507–10; Ko & Williams, supra note 14, at 11; see supra 
Part II. 
99 Mann, supra note 56, at 748. 
100 See supra Part III.A.3. 
101 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 1201–1210, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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D. Analyzing Current Policy 
The commonality among all the different tools adopted by policy 
makers for dealing with complex financial products is that they focus their 
attention on the demand side of the market—the default assumption being 
that consumers can be changed or imparted with means and knowledge that 
will allow them to understand the products. This is not to suggest that 
policy makers have not made any attempts to regulate the supply side of the 
market or to distribute the cost of complexity more reasonably in order to 
resolve market failures, but merely to establish the fact that such attempts 
were not adequately successful. Current policy, coupled with market 
structure, leads consumers to bear the high burden of understanding 
complex financial products by comprehending all of the disclosed 
information, attending seminars or switching their financial products after 
finding better ones in an allegedly more competitive environment. What is 
more, in addition to the above, financial institutions constantly create more 
complex products, supply more information to be analyzed in seminars, and 
close branches in underserved areas. As the cumulative burden on 
consumers adds up to extremely high transaction costs, the responsibilities 
placed by policy makers on consumers are simply unreasonable. 
In order to fully understand the unreasonable burden policy makers in 
this country have imposed on us—the consumers—let us picture for a 
second the consumer who follows the policy makers’ model. This consumer 
will seek to participate in the financial mainstream therefore she will 
probably try to open a bank account. To this end, she will likely go to the 
closest branch to her home and obtain a copy of the account manual. As this 
booklet is around 50 pages in length, she will sit at home and read it. In 
order to understand it, she will constantly look at the notes she made during 
her financial literacy seminars (which she will have passed successfully). 
After spending the days (and even weeks) required to understand the 
booklet (assuming she was successful), she will go to another two banks 
and undergo the same process. She will then compare all the different 
services—costs, benefits and disadvantages—only to find out that due to 
shrouding and bundling techniques each bank offers only a handful of 
products at cheaper costs than the others. Our consumer will not give up but 
rather will decide (as she learned in her seminars) which of the products are 
most important to her financial needs and will choose her bank accordingly 
(only to discover that competition did not actually create significant price 
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differences). She will then continue to monitor the documents she receives 
weekly or monthly from her bank in order to ensure that the prices and 
services have not changed, that her balance has been calculated correctly 
and that no unauthorized uses have been made of her account. If any 
product’s terms or fees should change, our consumer will undergo the same 
process described again. This scenario is based on the premise that our 
imaginary consumer lives in an area that actually has a variety of banks and 
that she knows how to read the disclosed information and make the proper 
calculations with regard to it. We also assume here that our imaginary 
consumer’s financial needs will remain constant; otherwise she will need to 
repeat this process for a new product (i.e. a credit card, a mortgage, etc.). 
By the way, we still have not factored in our consumer’s day-to-day life, 
which includes more than understanding financial products. She likely 
engages in basic, time-consuming activities, such as working 10 hours a 
day, having a family life, co-managing a household, paying bills, eating and 
sleeping (at least a few hours). 
Still, this average life that policy makers have planned for us is not the 
most problematic element in the policy’s design. The biggest problem 
arises if our imaginary consumer has not listened closely enough in her 
seminar, failed to understand certain legal language, miscalculated the rate 
of some hidden fee, or incorrectly compared the total gross amount of the 
service. In this case, she probably will have invested great time and effort to 
no avail, as eventually she will select a product that was not the most suited 
for her. Because she has failed to meet the policy makers’ default burden of 
ensuring understanding, she will pay more than necessary only because the 
product is too complex. 
Now let us examine the role of our imaginary consumer’s financial 
institution—that is the institution that designed and profited from the 
complex product. According to current policy, the financial institution’s 
role is much more modest. All in all, it supplies mandatory information 
after opening a branch and putting the complex product on the market. 
When imagining this picture, those of us who do not really know how much 
we pay for our financial products should feel quite normal.102 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 33–34 (stating several studies which found numerous 
consumers’ mistakes with regard to credit-based financial products). 
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However, the enormous private costs borne by consumers are dwarfed 
when compared to the social costs that all of us pay for this market 
structure. These costs begin with the damage to market competition, 
because of which consumers end up with inefficient products. It continues 
with some 60% of consumers losing their faith in banks and financial 
institutions.103 And it currently appears to end with the alienation of 28% of 
consumers from mainstream financial services, driven to use fringe banking 
products as an alternative.104 This results in a substantial decrease in social 
cohesion and a long-lasting loss of faith in financial institutions. 
Why has policy failed again and again to achieve a more reasonable 
and efficient risk allocation? First, consumers are not homogenous. As 
such, it is much more difficult to influence the market via uniform rules 
such as current disclosure and education. In addition to financial products, 
they also have a great deal of other retail products to navigate, alongside 
their own daily personal and professional lives. The nature and pace of life 
simply do not allow most consumers to and conduct financial calculations 
everyday. Such is life. Most attempts to widely steer the demand side of the 
consumer financial product market are likely to have little if any success. 
On the other hand, financial institutions are the “experts” on the financial 
market especially the complex products they so eagerly produce. They also 
know their consumers best, based on the segmentation processes they 
underwent while designing the product and their daily relationship with 
each and every one of them. In light of this, from a policy perspective, it 
seems much more reasonable to allocate many of the complexity risks to 
the financial institution or supply side of the market. 
The problem with current policy is that it does not seem to consider 
this approach to its full extent. On the one hand, policy makers seem 
determined to help achieve consumer comprehension of financial products. 
On the other hand, they function based on the same premise that they have 
adopted since the dawn of time—meaning that the problems do not stem 
                                                                                                                           
 
103 EDELMAN, EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER: U.S. FINANCIAL SERVICES AND BANKING 
INDUSTRIES (2012), available at http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012-edelman-trust-
barometer-us-financial-services-and-banking-industries (stating the results from an international survey 
which indicates that only 41%–46% of United States consumers trust financial institutions. This number 
is the lowest out of the 10 industries that were reviewed.). 
104 BURHOUSE & OSAKI, supra note 12, at 3. See supra note 56. 
2013] RETHINKING CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY 61 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.58 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
from the current policy framework but rather from the ways in which it is 
being implemented.105 This approach explains why we continue to see more 
ineffective disclosure, highly controversial seminars and several other 
instruments that do not assist in increasing consumer comprehension. The 
belief that if there are enough bank branches consumers will be able to 
make more conscious choices does not adequately appreciate the fact that 
each bank offers relatively the same (incomprehensible) product in a 
slightly different package. But worse still is the fact that all those policy 
means result in increasing costs to financial institutions, which in turn 
factor into the prices of their products, and again force the consumer to pay 
more for policy inefficiency. As product innovation and new pricing 
techniques probably will continue to be ahead of policy—in its current 
form—perhaps a better policy approach would be to stop giving consumers 
more of the same ineffective medicine, and more importantly, to cease 
holding them accountable for its inefficiency. 
The above analysis therefore leads to the conclusion that under the 
current premise, there will always be a new complex product, there will 
always be geographical areas that lack sufficient competition.106 and there 
will always be something new for consumers to learn. So if this side of the 
equation is so difficult to influence, perhaps we should consider changing 
the baseline premise. Instead of focusing on the demand side of the 
equation, it would behoove policy maker to try influencing the supply side 
of it. The common presumption is that “the market” supports the production 
of complex products and the exploitation of consumers’ misperceptions 
with regard to them. However when designing our policy, such an approach 
                                                                                                                           
 
105 I discussed the notion of “same policy in a slightly different package” above. See supra Part 
IV.A–C. The most salient example is probably the Dodd-Frank Act, which designated mandatory 
disclosure and financial literacy education as substantial tools in the new consumer protection policy in 
the financial market. See also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 28–29 (stating that in the past, as a 
result of consumers’ miscomprehension of many disclosure terms in TILA’s the regulator simply 
changed the disclosure rules in regulation Z). 
106 In fact, over the last few years, the concentration in the United States’ banking industry is 
experiencing an upward trend. David C. Wheelock, Have Acquisitions of Failed Banks Increased the 
Concentration of U.S. Banking Markets, 93 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 155 (2011); Ryan Swift, 
Banks, The Fed, and Moral Hazard, SWIFT ECONOMICS (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www. 
swifteconomics.com/2010/09/29/banks-fed-and-moral-hazard/ (stating that as of 2009, the big four 
banks in the United States—Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan-Chase and Wells Fargo—held 39% 
of United States customer deposits). 
62 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:23 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.58 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
should not ignore the fact that “the forces” responsible for driving the 
market to that point are in large part the financial institutions themselves. 
V. A NEW APPROACH 
A. The Approach 
The above discussion underscores the need for a new approach to 
addressing the failures created by financial product complexity. The main 
premise is that we cannot accept a reality in which consumers cannot 
understand their financial products and live peacefully with the market 
failures that derive from that reality. While investing regulation resources in 
the consumer side of the market only results in higher costs with highly 
controversial outcomes, it appears that a new approach should try to focus 
on extensively influencing the financial institution side. As I have 
mentioned, the drawback to regulating the supply side of the market is that 
financial institutions—by default—will focus on creating new and more 
complex products, as that is the most efficient way to draw profit from 
consumers’ miscomprehension of the products’ attributes.107 My argument 
is that a profit-oriented approach can also help to dissolve this failure. 
Therefore, I support a legal arrangement that will change the risk allocation 
rules, which currently, as I elaborated before, allocate most comprehension 
costs to the consumer side of the market. In order to achieve a change in 
risk allocation, policy should make it mandatory for financial institutions to 
undertake internal procedures and mechanisms that will ensure the result of 
financial product comprehension by each and every one of their consumers. 
In this way policy creates a strong incentive for financial institutions to 
make consumers comprehend their products better while using their unique 
knowledge and expertise to achieve this goal. It also refrains from 
intervening (at least not directly) with product design and financial 
innovation. As I will explain further,108 this is also a most efficient way to 
deal with the aforementioned market failures while supporting other social 
virtues. 
                                                                                                                           
 
107 See supra Part II. 
108 See infra Part V.B. 
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According to my proposed approach, financial institutions assume 
legal responsibility for resolving the consequent market failures derived 
from the complex products that they produce. The emphasis shifts from 
investing countless regulatory means that may or may not be appropriate 
for consumer comprehension, to persuading financial institutions (which 
interact with the consumer on a regular basis) to choose carefully the 
appropriate means of achieving consumer understanding of their products 
as a result. It is also shifts from designing regulatory tools that are used in a 
uniform way for all consumers into a much more individually-oriented 
approach, which obligates the financial institution to evaluate the way of 
achieving across-the-board consumer comprehension according to its 
special characteristics. For instance, a bank that overloads consumers with 
documents will not meet its obligation if it does not adequately ensure that 
every one of them has understood the products before using them. The 
documents can say anything (therefore the incentive to overload a consumer 
with information will probably reduce subsequently). Similarly, a banker 
who provides a service to “less informed consumers” will be required, for 
instance, to explain that if they fail to pay the charges on their credit card by 
a certain date, collectors will come to their houses and repossess their 
families’ cars at the start of the following month. Or to return to the 
example with which I opened this Article, my colleague would have a legal 
claim against his bank if it did not explain the role of and fee collected by, a 
correspondent bank in an international money transfer. 
Under this new approach, the question then becomes: were the means 
taken by a financial institution those necessary to ensure the result of 
comprehension by a specific consumer. If the answer is negative then the 
financial institution is liable for any damages that were caused to the 
consumer as a result of her incomprehension. As I will further elaborate, 
this rule would lead to a much more beneficial outcome. It would alter the 
allocation of costs in the consumer financial product market. It also would 
strengthen the two highly important social values to which we continue to 
return—consumer trust in financial institutions and social cohesion. What is 
more, together with other market incentives and change in regulation it 
would create a fundamental change in financial institutions’ practices. 
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B. Justifications 
Three main points support the premise that my theory is more 
beneficial, fair and socially valuable than the one that is currently in place. 
The first point deals directly with the issue of economic efficiency. As 
was analyzed above, complex financial products impose high transaction 
costs that reduce private benefits and social welfare. Since financial 
institution product complexity both creates those additional costs and is the 
source of great financial profit to the financial institutions, it seems it would 
also be most efficient to allocate the costs of attaining consumer 
understanding of those products to the financial institutions. Those 
institutions are in the best position to factor those costs into the design of 
their products as well as to distribute them equally and equitably among 
their consumers. Moreover, given that financial institutions design their 
complex financial products, there can be no question that they understand 
them best. There can also be no question that financial institutions possess, 
by far, the most accurate knowledge on each of their consumers due to 
segmentation techniques and their constant connection with them. 
Therefore, financial institutions are also the most fitting and efficient body 
to explain those products accurately to their consumers and to adapt this 
explanation to each and every one of them. This solution also would reduce 
regulation costs substantially—eliminating the cat and mouse syndrome, 
whereby regulators invest significant resources and time to determine the 
optimal rules for consumers to best comprehend a financial product, only to 
discover that financial institutions have changed the product to be exempt 
from regulatory scrutiny. Under my suggested approach, there is no safe 
harbor from regulatory scrutiny. The final responsibility for determining the 
measures that will achieve consumer comprehension rests with financial 
institutions, leaving regulators with the job of supervising their execution. 
The creation of a new default rule would also resolve the failure of 
“debiasing” which is inherent to the economy of shrouded products. To 
recall, according to the economy of shrouded products, in a competitive 
market financial institutions lack incentives to “debias” consumers, since 
“debiasing” will only lead those consumers to use their current shrouded 
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products more sophisticatedly (instead of switching suppliers).109 Therefore, 
no supplier will act first to “debias” consumers as it will not be able to 
make any profit from such an act. Under my approach, financial institutions 
will have to “debias” consumers with regard to their own products, 
therefore eliminating the first mover paradox. In this reality the incentive of 
all financial institutions to use more sophisticated shrouding techniques will 
reduce tremendously,110 and a practice of honest pricing can become an 
economic reality.111 Finally, my approach would also reduce the costs of 
disclosure and education. As the burden of consumer comprehension shifts 
to the financial institutions, there is no need to subject consumers to the 
large and frustrating amounts of mandatory disclosures or to financial 
literacy programs (which they of course might still attend for other 
reasons). Financial institutions would have the discretion to determine the 
most effective way to achieve consumer comprehension, given that the 
emphasis would have shifted from uniform means to achieving results. 
Naturally, this discretion would be subject to supervision and the risk of 
liability for breaching their duties. 
The second justification for my approach is that it aims to increase 
consumer trust at financial institutions.112 The concept of trust has a special 
implication and importance in the context of financial products for 
consumers. Trust in a country’s financial system is a founding concept of 
the entire banking business and of the financial product industry. The work 
of Ben-Oliel deals with this issue in depth.113 According to Ben-Oliel, 
several features establish trust as a primary principle of commercial 
banking. First, consumers who do not trust their banks will not deposit their 
funds with them or withdraw their already-deposited funds from them. If 
such consumers are numerous, the result is the utter lack of any financial 
system that relies on deposits to conduct its business. Furthermore, financial 
                                                                                                                           
 
109 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 1, at 506–10; see supra Part II. 
110 BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 30–40 (explaining the first mover paradox but focusing on a 
demand side-based solution). 
111 Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, In Praise of Honest Pricing, 45 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 23 
(2003) (discussing the economic justifications of honest pricing practices). 
112 Avinandan Mukherjee & Prithwiraj Nath, A Model of Trust in Online Relationship Banking, 
21 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 5, 13 (2003); Study Shows Consumers Distrust Banks More Than Any 
Other Industry, THE FINANCIAL BRAND, available at http://thefinancialbrand.com/22896/edelman-
banking-financial-services-consumer-trust-study/ (last visited July 20, 2013). 
113 RICARDO BEN-OLIEL, BANKING LAW (GENERAL PART) 102–03 (1996). 
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institutions are not ordinary retail service providers; they provide a service 
that has a substantial social impact and importance. It affects commerce 
efficiency, retail service distribution, economical liquidity, the nation’s 
financial strength and stability, and more. As policy makers are aware of 
the social importance of financial products and consumers’ trust in them, 
they too invest substantial amounts of funds every year in licensing, 
regulating, supervising, and deposit insurance—all of which are intended to 
increase consumer trust in financial institutions and their soundness.114 
Additionally, financial institutions themselves appreciate the crucial 
importance of consumer trust and continuously endeavor to improve it via 
advertisements, logos, loyalty programs, and the like. Finally, I would also 
maintain that the importance of trust in financial institutions is highly 
important in the United States, as a recent survey shows that only 46% of 
consumers trust financial institutions (and even less trust banks), which 
places those institutions at the bottom of the list of trustworthy businesses 
in the country.115 As I stated previously, we all pay a huge social price for 
this financial mistrust.116 Analyzing the market of financial products for 
consumers within the prism of trust underscores another major failure in the 
current market structure. On the one hand financial institutions need 
consumers trust to sustain their businesses; on the other hand the market 
they have created obligates them to uphold strategies involving tricks and 
traps, directly leading to a constant deterioration of the same trust they so 
eagerly seek to build. This reality is paradoxical and, as was previously 
mentioned, highly unbeneficial and even risky to society. However, under 
my aforementioned suggestion, financial institutions would be obligated to 
                                                                                                                           
 
114 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, 
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 267–69 (2001) (stating the federal deposit insurance system was 
established in order to increase consumers trust in the financial system); financial institutions 
supervision is also established to ensure consumers that the Government is committed to financial 
institutions’ soundness; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, Dodd-Frank Act 124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (2010) and § 1021, 124 Stat. at 1979 (increases the 
amounts insured by federal deposit insurance from $100,000 to $250,000. This act was supposed to 
increase consumers trust in the soundness of their deposits. It also established the CFPB in order to 
achieve a more fair market of financial product for consumers.). 
115 EDELMAN, supra note 103, at 8–9; Temkin Trust Ratings, TEMKIN GRP. (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://experiencematters.wordpress.com/2012/04/30/2012-temkin-trust-ratings/ (ranks consumer trust in 
206 different types of businesses and places the largest United States banks at the bottom of list). 
116 See Haim & Mann, supra note 56 (the social costs of fringe banking are extremely high). 
2013] RETHINKING CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY 67 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.58 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
maintain trust in their products by ensuring their comprehension by 
consumers.117 There is no better way to secure consumer trust than to 
legally mandate that financial institutions resolve one of the biggest 
difficulties faced by consumers in today’s financial world—the complexity 
of financial products. In parallel, my model imposes a duty on policy 
makers, regulators and the courts to act as supervisors of the execution of 
this obligation, and as such to contribute their share toward regaining 
consumer trust in financial institutions. To conclude this point I should 
emphasize that in addition to the various policy makers’ efforts to increase 
trust in financial institutions discussed in the previous section, the concept 
of consumer trust and its importance have not disappeared from the eyes of 
the courts. In several cases, United States courts have imposed fiduciary 
duties on financial institutions requiring them to consider consumers’ 
interests even before their own and to explain their services to them.118 As 
is well known, fiduciary duties are used to uphold the relationship of 
trust.119 Nevertheless, like policy makers, the court has adopted those duties 
in accordance with a default rule by which the consumers bear the burden 
of demystifying the complexity of financial products.120 Therefore, only in 
specific cases in which consumers could prove the existence of a special 
trust relationship did the courts imposed the standards of fiduciary 
                                                                                                                           
 
117 Jens Baumgarten, Ben Snowman & Wei Ke, Rebuild Consumer Trust by Offering a Fair Deal, 
AM. BANKER (June 21, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/search/index.html?zkDo=search& 
frommonth=01&fromday=14&fromyear=2012&tomonth=07&today=14&toyear=2013&publication=all
_articles&query=Rebuild+Consumer+Trust+by+Offering+a+Fair+Deal&x=18&y=9 (stating that a 
comprehensible communication of product costs to consumers is a key element on winning back 
consumers trust in banks). 
118 See, e.g., Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1097–99 (Ohio 1981) (The court declared that a 
fiduciary relationship is one in which special confidence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity 
of another and there is a resulting position of superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this special 
trust. Therefore it was determined that when a bank gives advice to consumer regarding a loan or 
mortgage insurance, it acts as a fiduciary.); Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 285 (Ala. 1985) 
(the court stated that a fiduciary duty may arise when a customer reposes trust in a bank and relies on the 
bank for financial advice or in other special circumstances); ADT Operations, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 173 Misc. 2d 959, 963 (N.Y. Sup. 1997) (stating that fiduciary duty may be created by express 
provisions of contract or by factors such as length of relationship of parties, their financial 
interdependence, and their sharing of confidential and proprietary information). 
119 J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 3–35 (1981). 
120 See, e.g., Rush v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 343 S.E.2d 667 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the 
normal bank-depositor arrangement is not a fiduciary relationship although it can become one under 
limited circumstances such as when the bank advises a consumer on services that it offers). 
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relationship. In light of my previous analysis, the reasoning behind the 
courts’ conception that consumers should trust their financial institutions 
only on “special occasions” remains a mystery. My above-expressed 
opinion on the importance of trust in any financial system is quite different 
from that which guides policy makers and the courts today on the issue of 
too complex financial products. In light of Ben-Oliel’s work, I believe that 
the principle of trust in a financial market does not need any proof. It is one 
of the founding axioms to which economies and societies should aspire. 
Ideally, consumers should be able to trust each and every product that 
financial institutions create, and legal arrangements must ensure and protect 
this trust as a highly important social value. My suggested approach could 
assist in achieving this goal by introducing a default rule acknowledging 
that financial institutions bear primary responsibility for gaining their 
consumers’ trust. 
The third argument in support of my approach is perhaps the hardest to 
pin down as it considers social values such as fellowship and cohesion, to 
which I refer to in the context of this Article as the social obligation to 
ensure the availability of mainstream financial products to all segments of 
society. As was mentioned previously (but is worth mentioning again), 28% 
of United States households does not have access to mainstream financial 
products.121 Again, one of the primary causes to this situation is the 
complexity of mainstream financial products, which has the greatest effect 
on those who experience more difficulty understanding these products.122 
Setting aside the social costs resulting from this situation (as fringe 
financial products are much more costly for their users and for society), the 
more significant problem is the social message that sustaining this reality 
sends to almost a third of the country population—that they simply do not 
belong to its mainstream. For these consumers being stuck in the reality of 
using pawnshops or money orders instead of payment cards sends a 
message that they are excluded from the dream of success. Under this 
reality, society suffers not only from the financial costs of fringe banking 
but mainly from the decrease in social cohesion. In the 21st century, society 
cannot afford to have the accessibility of financial products for its LMI 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 BURHOUSE & OSAKI, supra note 12, at 3–6. 
122 See supra Part III.C. 
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consumers dependent on them paying more for less (paying more for fringe 
banking and getting less beneficial services). It also cannot afford to have 
consumers living under the impression that they cannot understand the 
mainstream. The way to resolve this situation passes through providing 
those consumers with products that match their needs.123 One highly 
important attribute of those needs is comprehensibility.124 It is highly 
possible that imposing a duty on financial institutions to guarantee product 
comprehensibility to all consumers will cause them to focus more on 
upholding this duty even with regard to the LMI segment. As serving LMI 
consumers with current complex products might become more costly to 
financial institutions (due to comprehension costs), and as those institutions 
cannot raise the price of a product only among a specific sector of the 
population, the logical outcome is that those institutions will seek a way to 
create new products which will better fit LMI consumers and thereby 
reduce comprehension costs. Such a reform might lead financial institutions 
to focus on and compete within the LMI segment and provide those 
consumers with the products that they want and need. After all, for a nation 
that is proud of making complex products such as computers and cars 
simple and available for the entire world, one just cannot simply accept that 
this innovative capability stops at the door step of mainstream financial 
institutions. My personal belief is that the competitive pressures described 
above might cause financial institutions to finally provide LMI consumers 
the products they really desire and can understand better. 
C. The Means 
The successful execution of my proposal depends on two main factors: 
precise implementation and support by a suitable market environment that 
will encourage it. While the first factor deals directly with the application of 
the liability rule I suggested above, the other means that I will mention 
serves to support it by steering the market towards the direction of 
transparency, comprehensibility and trust, as I have suggested in this 
                                                                                                                           
 
123 Mann, supra note 56, at 747–51 (stating that LMI consumers have different financial 
constraints and therefore they prefer institutions that can meet those constraints). 
124 Id. at 741 (“One reason households are choosing payday loans instead of credit cards and 
fixed-term bank loans is that they make more sense for them.”). 
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Article. My discussion will continue by addressing the implementation of 
the liability rule moving to the methods which will support it (beginning 
with market-oriented incentives and moving to more extensive regulation). 
1. Assessing Liability 
Although the liability rule I suggested above is quite broad, its success 
lies in precise implementation. The most important factor in the 
implementation process is the adaptation of the means that financial 
institutions choose to use with regard to each and every product that they 
offer. For example, the means that should be employed by financial 
institutions in order to ensure each consumer’s comprehension with regard 
to credit cards might be different from those that should apply with regard 
to checking accounts. Those means might also change from one consumer 
to another, as different consumers possess different kinds of knowledge and 
comprehension skills. Therefore, it will eventually be up to financial 
institutions to determine the means of ensuring that each consumer 
comprehends each and every product. In order to accomplish this task, 
financial institutions will likely need to undertake more extensive internal 
procedures and mechanisms on macro and micro levels. On the macro level 
financial institutions will have to use their knowledge and expertise in order 
to identify the important attributes that are relevant for consumers in each 
product and to determine the best ways of communicating the information 
to them clearly. On the micro level they will probably have to hire more 
capable personnel, conduct more precise and product-oriented trainings, 
and encourage their employees to understand better the capabilities and 
needs of each consumer. In extreme cases, if all the necessary means to 
achieve consumer comprehension fail, financial institutions will have to 
offer their consumers advice that suits their financial needs. As will be 
explained below, I also believe that some regulatory guidelines can be 
helpful in accomplishing this precise implementation and in relieving some 
of the vagueness that might surround it. The implementation of these means 
will have to be assessed, eventually, by regulators and courts. They will 
impose liability on financial institutions that have not taken the necessary 
means to ensure consumer comprehension. 
2013] RETHINKING CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY 71 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.58 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
2. Measuring Complexity 
An important market-oriented means of steering financial institutions 
towards the new direction I have suggested in this Article is to encourage 
more competition in the field of service quality and especially precise and 
clear explanation of financial products. As was elaborated above, financial 
product comprehension depends mainly on product design, consumer 
characteristics, and financial institutions’ investments in allowing 
consumers to comprehend their products fully. While the research entailed 
herein indicates that in practice the two first factors remain constant, policy 
can lead to encourage the improvement of financial institution 
representatives’ professionalism, services, and the manner in which they 
communicate the explanation of their products to their consumers. The 
most salient difficulty in this context is causing financial institutions to 
compete on this plane, especially given that within the current market 
structure there is no efficient way for consumers to evaluate 
professionalism and product quality in advance.125 Therefore, under the 
current market structure consumer preferences are distorted and create high 
search costs and market stagnation. 
To resolve these difficulties I suggest a reputation-based incentive 
system which will require every financial institution branch to publicly post 
a service quality ranking assigned by the regulator. According to my 
suggestion a uniform index of service quality evaluation should be 
implemented by the regulator. This index would calculate several factors 
that influence consumer comprehensibility of financial products, such as: 
professionalism, trainings, consumer satisfaction, consumer feedbacks, the 
number of justified complaints with regard to incomprehensibility of 
products, and others. The index would be determined by an official 
regulator and it would be mandatory to display it in every financial 
institution’s entrance and on every service counter. As such, consumers 
would be able to easily appreciate in advance their chances of receiving a 
more professional, precise and comprehensible financial service at each and 
                                                                                                                           
 
125 See supra Part III.A.3. 
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every provider, an act that consequently would strengthen consumer trust in 
professional and trustworthy financial institutions.126 
A similar standard is already being applied, for example, in the 
restaurant industry in order to measure their sanitation and hygiene levels. 
As studies show, such standards have led to a substantial improvement in 
restaurant sanitation, as consumers were given a means of evaluating this 
important parameter before deciding whether to eat at a restaurant.  127  
Consequently, the number of consumers who eat in restaurants has 
increased as well. Similar consequences can be achieved in the financial 
institution industry should they be subject to a trustworthy, mandatory, 
public and constant evaluation of their service quality. This kind of standard 
will lead financial institutions to improve their services, products, and 
consumer trust in the long run. Accordingly, consumers will feel more 
content as they will be able to evaluate financial institutions according to a 
parameter that is highly important to them as individuals and to society as a 
whole. 
3. Supporting Trustworthy Practices 
The next policy step I wish to suggest is to reduce entry thresholds in 
the market of financial products for consumers for non-financial-in-nature 
institutions which can be determined to be supporting trustworthy practices 
and transparent pricing. I believe that those institutions that already uphold 
desired business practices should be considered more positively if and when 
they wish to take part in the market of financial products for consumers. I 
strongly support the idea raised by Mann a few years ago that Wal-Mart, for 
instance, should have a bank.128 Although Mann suggested this idea as a 
means of cutting the costs of payments and increasing competition in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
126 Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 112, at 12 (stating that reputation is a key element to gain 
consumers trust in financial institutions). 
127 Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene, 1 AM. ECON. 
J. MICROECONOMICS 237 (2009). 
128 Ronald J. Mann, A Requiem for Sam’s Bank, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953 (2008) (suggesting a 
uniform model for the licensing of payment suppliers that will allow for more institutions—like Wal-
Mart—to enter the payment market subject to specific and necessary regulatory requirements). 
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financial market, I believe that it can also contribute substantially to 
reducing financial product complexity for several reasons.129 
First, it is highly probable that retail institutions will introduce new 
financial product pricing techniques which will cut the costs of financial 
products while increasing profits from other retail products. For example, 
retailers can offer financial products at lower prices in order to attract more 
consumers to their place of business, and by doing so, increase their retail 
products sales and, subsequently, their profits.130 In this case, institutions 
will not be driven so easily to use pricing techniques that profit from 
consumer miscomprehension of their financial products. To put it more 
simply, while financial institutions are caught by the practices of shrouding, 
bundling, price planning and complex language to increase their profits, 
some retail suppliers are more willing to find other ways of achieving those 
profits. Therefore it appears that those institutions will be able to introduce 
much more comprehensible financial products to consumers. 
Second, many retail suppliers base their marketing strategies on 
consumer trust in their business practices, by offering transparent, clear and 
comprehensible products.131 They do so in order to ensure that their 
consumers will continue to make purchases from their stores. The ones I 
wish to target in this proposal are those with the most outstanding results in 
these fields. It is only reasonable that suppliers that already uphold those 
strategies will not change their behavior when they move to the business of 
financial products for consumers. Therefore, they will probably apply the 
“what you see is what you get” policy to financial products. 
Finally, in addition to the benefits that new institutions will bestow 
upon their financial product consumers, they can also bring about 
competitive pressures on the plane of product complexity, especially as 
they increase in number. This pressure might be exactly what financial 
institutions need in order to change their current business practices and 
introduce new, more transparent and comprehensible, ones. In this case the 
                                                                                                                           
 
129 Mann, supra note 56, at 744 (stating that Wal-Mart would be able to better serve the financial 
needs of LMI consumers, partly since it already enjoy their trust and familiar with their tastes for 
products). 
130 See Mann, supra note 128, at 957–63. 
131 EDELMAN, supra note 103, at 7 (stating that consumers trust retail suppliers—such as food and 
beverage suppliers, telecommunication suppliers, technology suppliers, etc.—much more than financial 
institutions). 
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chances that product complexity will reduce in the overall financial market 
also increase. 
4. Supervising Contract Terms 
The last point I wish to raise is to impose restrictions on certain terms 
in consumer financial product contracts. This suggestion is, of course, not 
completely new. Several countries, for many years, have enacted laws and 
regulations which limit unfair contractual terms.132 Banning certain 
contractual terms is also a required outcome of this article’s analysis, as 
market efficiency rules support imposing a duty on financial institutions to 
explain their products to consumers—a duty that could become highly 
impossible when contract terms are abusive or overly incomprehensible. 
However, the risk of this practice lies with its intrusion on contract design, 
which might eventually be reflected in the price of the products.133 There is 
also the risk that financial institutions will adapt their contractual terms to 
bypass restrictions that target specific clauses. 
The issue of regulating standard contract terms is quite broad. 
Naturally, a full discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, in light of my discussion so far, I wish to suggest some 
guidelines for a moderate and balanced supervision of consumer financial 
product contract terms that would reduce consumer miscomprehension of 
their financial products, while limiting their negative influence on the 
market to the greatest possible extent. 
                                                                                                                           
 
132 The European Union has enacted the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive at 1993 
in order to ban unfair terms in consumer contracts. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95). The United Kingdom has enacted the Unfair 
Contract Term Act and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulation; both of them allow banning 
contract terms that unfairly create a significant imbalance between consumers and their financial 
institutions. See Unfair Contract Term Act, 1977, c. 50; Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/2083. In Israel, Standard Contacts Law, 5743-1982, 37 LSI 6 (1982) 
allows courts to ban and even redesign standard contract terms if they are abusive to consumer rights. In 
the United States the court adopted the doctrine of unconscionability in order to uphold judicial scrutiny 
with regard to abusive contract terms. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 27, at 1258–78 (suggesting a 
model of regulating non-salient contractual terms and discussing the unconscionability doctrine). Mann 
has also suggested banning some terms in credit cards contracts if their effects are highly unfair to 
consumers. MANN, supra note 1, at 143–48. 
133 MANN, supra note 1, at 143–48; Korobkin, supra note 27, at 1249–51. 
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To begin, with regard to the method of supervision, I suggest that 
policy should not focus on banning specific contractual terms (which might 
be too aggressive intervention), but rather on creating contradictory 
presumptions with regard to different types of terms that might abuse 
consumers’ right to understand financial products or place them at undue 
disadvantage, despite explanations provided by financial institutions.134 By 
basing contact terms supervision on contradictory presumptions, I support 
the creation of a balanced mechanism that prevents automatically banning 
certain terms, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, shifts the burden to 
financial institutions to prove why a specific term is not abusive or unduly 
disadvantageous to consumers. In this way my proposal also prevents the 
continuous practice by which financial institutions find ways to adapt their 
terms to be excluded from regulatory restrictions, as the suggested policy 
targets types of terms, rather than specific ones. Moreover, my proposal 
would create an ex-ante mechanism that could deter financial institutions 
from using certain debatable terms in their contracts, as they might not wish 
to take the risk that those terms will be determined void at a later stage. 
Second, with regard to the scale of supervision, I do not believe that 
supervision should be restricted to non-salient terms.135 As we have seen, 
financial product incomprehensibility is not limited to non-salient terms, 
but in many cases involves consumers who cannot correctly understand 
basic salient attributes of their products, including their uses and price 
structures (even though we believe they consider those terms when 
purchasing the product).136 When all else fails I believe that regulators and 
courts should have the tools to resolve this situation and the inefficiency 
arising from it, even if it means intervening in contract design more 
intensively. Furthermore, the main reason not to regulate salient contractual 
                                                                                                                           
 
134 A similar approach was taken by the Israeli legislator in Standard Contracts Law, 37 LSI 6. 
According to article four of the law, terms that would be presumed as abusive or unduly disadvantage 
consumers are, for instance: a term that allows the supplier to shift his liability to a third party, a term 
that allows the supplier to change salient features of the contract (without the consumer consent) after its 
enactment (except if the change acquires from changes which are not in the supplier control), a term 
which changes the default burden of proof as it was define by law, etc. 
135 But see MANN, supra note 1, at 143–48 (supporting only the regulation of non-salient contract 
terms in credit cards contracts); Korobkin, supra note 27, at 1254–55 (supporting the regulation of 
salient terms by the market). 
136 See supra Part III (consumers are unable to understand basic terms in their recently obtained 
mortgage agreements). 
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terms is that market forces are often the most efficient means of doing so.137 
Nevertheless, I think that my discussion so far proves that the market 
force’s ability to resolve the complexity issues of financial products for 
consumers is exaggeratedly over estimated. Therefore it will be up to policy 
makers and courts to take the initiative in proper cases. However, due to the 
risks involved in influencing product design in an overly aggressive manner 
that may be a result of banning salient terms, this kind of action should be 
considered with more attention to its influence on product design and 
market efficiency. 
Finally, if a term is banned, it is only reasonable that the banning body 
(regulator or courts, as I will elaborate below) will have discretion to offer 
new appropriate designs of the term, and in severe cases, even to impose a 
replacement term. As such the market can apply the wide default rule which 
places the burden of comprehension on financial institutions, but also 
allows for the necessary flexibility for the market to apply exceptions when 
needed. 
D. Is There a Downside? 
The main consideration that may be raised as a downside to my 
proposal is the risk of increase of consumer financial product costs. 
Arguably, as a result of imposing “comprehension duties” on financial 
institutions, they are liable to factor the “comprehension costs” into their 
pricing calculations. While this result is likely to some extent, I believe that 
several considerations—economic and moral—may reduce its probability 
and undermine its negativity. 
First, as consumer trust in financial institutions will increase under my 
proposed policy, the amount of consumers who use those institutions’ 
products will increase as well.138 This will increase financial institutions’ 
profits, which may in turn undermine the need for a high increase in 
product prices.  139  
                                                                                                                           
 
137 Korobkin, supra note 27, at 1254–55. 
138 BURHOUSE & OSAKI, supra note 12, at 27 (at least 7.1% of unbanked consumers do not 
engage the services of banks since they do not trust them). 
139 Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 111, at 27–28. 
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Second, as service quality and trust will become measurable, the 
search and switching costs borne by consumers will decrease, rendering the 
consumer financial product market more competitive, bringing with it more 
efficiency and further reduction in financial product prices.140 
Third, as product comprehension will become a norm within financial 
institutions, costs will be able to streamlined as much as possible and enjoy 
the benefits of economies of scale, leading to a decrease in costs. Increased 
competition from institutions that support the production of much more 
comprehensible financial products can also foster market efficiency and 
bring upon further reduction in costs. 
Fourth, and on a more moral note, there are simply some social values 
that are worth paying for. Social cohesion and consumer trust in financial 
institutions are two of them. Those values become meaningless if, given a 
need, society is unwilling to take the necessary steps to maintain them. 
Under this assumption, even some reduction in profits is not necessarily a 
loss. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following discussion leads to very specific policy 
recommendations on two planes—enactment and enforceability. 
Among the existing regulators, the supervision and regulation of the 
subject should be delegated to the CFPB as it is the body in charge on 
enforcing a “fair, transparent, and competitive”141 consumer financial 
product market, and whose stated goal is to ensure that “consumers are not 
subject to deceptive, unfair, abusive, or discriminatory practices.”142 
In the course of its duty, the CFPB should issue guidelines for 
financial institutions to maintain their duty to insure comprehension of 
financial products among consumers. These kinds of guidelines particularly 
could help to relieve some vagueness that might accompany my proposal in 
its first stages. Nevertheless, as I discussed previously, the final measure of 
how best to implement those guidelines will be determined on a case-by-
                                                                                                                           
 
140 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
141 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1021, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (emphasis added). 
142 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 74, at 9–10 (emphasis added). 
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case basis by the financial institutions, who will also decide whether more 
steps need to be taken to ensure each consumer comprehension. 
Additionally, the CFPB should issue regulations with regard to the 
types of contractual terms that are presumed to be abusive to consumers or 
to place them at an undue disadvantage. The Bureau should then take 
measures to abolish those terms, to ensure they are amended, and in severe 
cases to impose more efficient and just ones. 
Furthermore, the Bureau should announce a series of periodical 
inspections designed to form an index of “service and trust” or “trustworthy 
practices.” As was explained above, those inspections will evaluate the 
professionalism, comprehension and training levels of financial institution 
employees, as well as their level of justified law suits and complaints. It 
might also consider consumer satisfaction from a particular financial 
institution and the level of correlation between institution (or branch) 
products and its specific types of consumers. The index should be given as 
a certificate of the Bureau, and it should be made mandatory that the index 
be published in every entrance and counter of financial institutions. In order 
to implement its roles in this context, the Bureau should continue to search 
for new ways to obtain consumers’ feedback on the services they have 
received and expose cases in which they have used products that were not 
clear to them. A useful way to obtain such feedback might be to contact 
consumers directly regarding a financial institution about which the Bureau 
has reasonable suspicion (from inspection or complaints) that those 
consumers’ rights were abused. 
Lastly, the Bureau should cooperate with other regulators to determine 
the means of factoring trustworthy practices into the licensing procedure of 
new applicants. In this way it would foster the inclusion of new appropriate 
institutions in the market of complex financial products. 
Beside the important job of the Bureau a very important role in the 
implementation of my proposal is reserved for the courts. As I suggested 
before, following Ben-Oliel’s work, it seems that courts will have to 
implement the concept of fiduciary duty as a broad concept that applies to 
every financial service and product. Furthermore, it will be up to the courts 
to determine in each and every case whether financial institutions have 
indeed ensured the result of financial product comprehension by 
consumers. Failure to do so will render financial institutions liable for 
breach of their duties. Furthermore, I believe courts should apply the 
principle of fiduciary duties to determine whether a contractual term is 
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abusive to a consumers or whether it places them at unfair disadvantage.143 
In such a case those terms should be declared void by the court. 
I strongly believe that a combined move by the appropriate regulator 
and courts finally could steer the market of financial products for 
consumers into a much more comprehensible and competitive era that will 
benefit us all. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This Article deals with complex financial products; however, its 
fundamental message is not incomprehensible at all. Consumers should be 
able to understand their financial products without taking disproportional 
measures and incurring high personal and social costs in the process. My 
analysis identifies product complexity as a primary cause of several failures 
in the market of consumer financial products. It also identifies a mismatch 
between the current policy measures which allocate the high costs of 
complexity to the demand side of the market, and its efficiency in resolving 
market failures. My thesis is that a revision of the policy framework such 
that financial institutions are designated as the primary body responsible for 
achieving consumer comprehension holds a crucial role in promoting a 
more efficient, trustworthy, and equitable financial market. At the same 
time we can have more confidence that decisions made by consumers who 
understand the nature and attributes of their financial products will bring 
upon a more competitive, stable and sound financial market. 
While some might disagree with my suggestions, I hope that at the 
very least, most can agree that the analysis of this pervasive issue should 
raise considerable discussion with regard to the importance of its resolution. 
                                                                                                                           
 
143 As it well known, fiduciary duty supports higher standards of conduct by the obligated side. 
See SHEPHERD, supra note 119. Therefore, applying the fiduciary duty’s standards to analyze contractual 
terms in the financial market will allow the court to impose a wider test than the one currently applied 
by other doctrines, such as the unconscionability doctrine. For implementations of the concept of 
fiduciary duties in Banking Law see: RUTH PLATO-SHINAR, THE BANKS’ FIDUCIARY DUTY 31–71, 351–
453 (2010). 
